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The Deep Structure
of Capital Gains
William D. Popkin*
The capital gainspreference has been viewed as a means by which taxpayers are
spared being taxedfully in a single yearfor income earned over a number ofprevious
years. This Article argues that the tax preferencefor capital gains was intended to
provide economic incentives by encouraging transferability, risk, and investment, not
to achieve equity by a crudeform of income averaging. This Article criticaly evalu-
ates judicial doctrine in light of these economic policies and concludes that courts
have not effectively bridged the gap between policy and the statutory language and
structure. The author explains how the tax treatment of capital gains could be im-
proved and examines the obstacles to improvement.
INTRODUCTION
THE TAX preference for capital gains' has been available to in-
dividuals since 19212 and to corporations since 1942.? The
broad contours of eligibility are clear enough: gain from salary,
dividends, interest, and sales of inventory is ordinary income,
while gain accruing to long term investments is capital gain.4
Preferentially treated capital gain arises only from the sale or ex-
* Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington School of Law. A.B.,
Harvard University (1958); LL.B., Harvard University (1961).
1. Preferentially treated long term capital gains are usually referred to as "capital
gains" and that practice is followed here. Short term capital gains have been variously
taxed as ordinary income or as a less favorably treated category of capital gains. See gener-
ally Wells, Legislative History of Treatment of Capital Gains Under the Federal Income Tax,
1913-1948, 2 NAT'L TAX J. 12 (1949).
2. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
3. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 150(b)(10)(A), 56 Stat. 798, 843 (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. § 1201(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
4. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, DIscussION DRAFT OF A STUDY OF DEFINI-
TIONAL PROBLEMS IN CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 1 (1960) [hereinafter cited as A.L.I.].
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change of a capital asset held for more than one year.5 Gain from
the sale of inventory is ordinary income because inventory is not a
capital asset.6 Salary, dividends, and interest are ordinary income
because they do not derive from a sale or exchange.7
This broad statutory definition, however, has never prevented
the courts from limiting the scope of the capital gains preference'
by such techniques as denying capital gains on the sale of rights to
future income9 or contract rights to deal with others,' 0 or by nar-
rowly construing the statutory term "sale."" Yet the courts have
never convincingly reconciled the language of the statute with the
tax policy supporting the capital gains preference. Little has been
done to link doctrine to an underlying theory of capital gains, and
the few attempts made have been misguided.
The dominant judicial justification for capital gains is that
they relieve the taxpayer from the oppressive effects which the
progressive tax rate structure would have on accrued gain
bunched into the year of sale.' 2 The preference supposedly pro-
vides a crude form of income averaging, more closely approximat-
ing the tax which would have been due if it had been imposed as
the gain accrued. The preference is also said to be economically
beneficial in that the removal of the bunching burden imposed by
progressive rates on accrued income encourages the disposition of
those items defined as capital assets. Unfortunately, these justifi-
cations do not accord with either the legislative history or the stat-
utory scheme. The capital gains preference was not intended as a
form of income averaging. Its purpose instead was to provide an
economic incentive to transfer risky investments-not to further
tax equity. The incentive would be necessary even if tax rates
were not progressive, or if no gain had been bunched into a single
year.
This Article reinterprets existing doctrine in light of statutory
5. I.R.C. § 1222(3)-(l1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
6. Id. § 1221(l) (1976).
7. See generally id. § 1222 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., 364 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1960);
Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955).
9. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1958).
10. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130-31 (2d Cir. 1962).
11. See, e.g., Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 107 (1932).
12. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 572 (1965); Commissioner v. Gil-
lette Motor Transp., 364 U.S. at 134; Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. at 265;
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. at 106; see also U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TAX ADVISORY STAFF
OF THE SECRETARY, FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND LossES
13 (1951) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY STUDY]. But see A.L.I., supra note 4, at 10-13.
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purpose and provides a framework for evaluating and revising eli-
gibility rules for capital gains treatment. The Article initially dis-
cusses the history of the capital gains preference in the United
States as an economic incentive.' 3 Next it considers the lock-in
problem, analyzing the courts' failure to develop doctrines limit-
ing the capital gains preference to its original purpose of removing
obstacles to transferability. 4 The Article proceeds with an exami-
nation of the risk requirement for capital gains eligibility.1 5 Fo-
cusing on the sale of a carved-out income interest doctrine, the
Article emphasizes that a distinction must be made between gain
accruing due to risk and gain accruing due to the mere passage of
time.'6 The Article then addresses the investment requirement for
capital gains treatment and the doctrinal confusion which this re-
quirement has engendered.' Finally, the Article considers the
difficulties of implementing the economic incentive rationale and
concludes with a discussion of future possibilities. 18
I. ECONOMIC INCENTIVE OR INCOME AVERAGING
With few exceptions,19 there has never been much doubt in the
United States of the propriety of including capital gains in the
income tax base.20 This contrasts sharply with a European tradi-
tion of excluding capital gains from income, essentially because
they could not reasonably be considered available for consump-
tion.21 The only important tax equity question which arose in this
13. See infra notes 19-43 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 44-84 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 85-162 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 163-203 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 204-24 and accompanying text.
19. See Gray v. Darlington, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 63, 66 (1872); Plehn, The Concept of
Income, As Recurrent, Consumable Receipts, 14 AM. EcoN. REv. 1, 10-12 (1924).
20. See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1921);
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920); Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179, 183
(1918); see also L. SELTZER, THE NATURE AND TAX TREATMENT OF CAPITAL GAINS AND
LOSSES 29-36 (1951) (comparing history of capital gains taxation in England and the
United States); Clark, The Paradox of Capital Gains: Taxable Income That Ought Not to Be
Currently Taxed, in 2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1243, 1243-44 (1959) (noting that Con-
gress has never indicated that capital gains should not be taxed); Nelson, The Question of
Taxing Capital Gains: I1 The Case Against Taxation, 7 LAW & CoNTEMaP. PROS. 208,
209-11 (1940) (examining early Supreme Court treatment of capital gains).
21. See L. SELTZER, supra note 20, at 11; Nelson, supra note 20, at 208-09. For inter-
esting arguments that capital gains should be excluded from the income tax base because
people do not treat them as available for ordinary consumption, see M. DAVID, ALTERNA-
TivE APPROACHES TO CAPITAL GAINS TAxATION 50 (1968); L. SELTZER, supra, at 8-10;
Blum, 4 Handy Summary of the Capital Gains Arguments, 35 TAxEs 247, 250-51 (1957);
1983]
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country was whether progressive tax rates might subject realized
capital gains to a much higher tax than if the appreciation in value
had been taxed annually as it accrued. Responding to this con-
cern, in 1920 the House passed a bill which would have reduced
the tax on gain attributable both to investments and personal serv-
ices if such gain accrued over more than three years.22 But the
1921 statute, the first to provide for preferential tax rates on capi-
tal gains, did not address the issue of bunched personal service
income, and dealt with capital gains only because of the economic
impact of bunching. 23 It was feared that if high tax rates applied
to the proceeds of such sales, taxpayers would be "locked in"
to their investments and retain them well beyond their economic
usefulness. Bunching caused an economic, not an equity,
problem.24
Goode, The Economic Defnition ofIncome, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 1, 4-5
(J. Pechman ed. 1977).
Consumption tax advocates took the argument one step further and maintained that the
act of saving, not the compulsion to save, justified excluding capital gains from the tax
base. See Fisher, Comment on President Plehn's Address, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 66-67
(1924); Goode, supra, at 6-7, 9.
Two other arguments have been made for giving further preferential treatment to capi-
tal gains. The first is relief from inflation. See J. MEADE, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM
OF DIRECT TAXATION 101-05 (1978); Brinner, Inflation and the Defnition of Taxable Per-
sonal Income, in INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX 121, 126-32 (H. Aaron ed. 1976);
Groves, Taxation ofCapital Gains, in 2 TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM 1193, 1198-99 (1959)
(further preferential treatment is unnecessary in times of moderate or light inflation). A
Senate amendment to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), would have indexed the
basis of corporate stock and real estate where these assets were capital assets or assets used
in a trade or business and held for more than one year. The basis adjustment would not
have been used for determining depreciation but only for computing gain or loss on sale or
disposition. This inflation adjustment did not appear in the final version of the Act. See
H. CON. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 478, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1190, 1257. Had it appeared, a major argument for preferential capital gains treat-
ment would have been eliminated.
A second argument is that the increase in value due to a decline in interest rates should
not be taxed. See Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89
YALE L.J. 1081, 1109-12 (1980).
22. See Wells, supra note I, at 13-14 (discussing legislative history of H.R. 14198,
66th Cong. 2d Sess. (1920)). Backward proration of income was not adopted because of its
administrative complexity. TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 21.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 350,67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 (pt.
2) C.B. 168, 176; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1 (pt.
2) C.B. 181, 189-90; see also Internal Revenue Hearings Before the Comm. on Fin. U.S.
Senate on H.R. 8245 Revenue Act o1921, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37, 307 (1921) (state-
ment of Dr. T.S. Adams, Tax Advisor, Treas. Dep't) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Dr.
T.S. Adams].
24. Some commentators find the legislative history ambiguous. See, e.g., M. DAVID,
supra note 21, at 37; Miller, The "CapitalAsset" Concept: A Critique ofCapital Gains Taxa-
Vol. 33:153
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The concern with economic impact was apparent not only
from the legislative history but from the context and structure of
the statute. In 1921, as now, a crucial political concern was the
reduction of tax burdens to stimulate economic activity.25 To that
end, the capital gains preference was one of several provi-
sions, including tax deferral of like-kind and reorganization ex-
changes,26 designed to facilitate economically desirable transfers.
As with capital gains, some courts have interpreted the tax defer-
ral provisions as implementing a tax equity principle whereby the
taxpayer should not be taxed when retaining a continuity of inter-
est in the underlying investment.27 However, nothing of the sort
ion: II, 59 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 n.1 (1950); Note, Distinguishing Ordinary Income from
Capital Gain Where Rights to Future Income Are Sold, 69 HARV. L. REv. 737, 739-41
(1956); Note, A Spreading of Receipts Formulafor Creating a Capital Gains/Ordinary In-
come Brightline: Contract Termination Payments and Business- Versus-Investment Assets, 87
YALE L.J. 729, 729 n.5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note,A Spreading ofReceipts Formula];
see also Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale ofa Business Opportunity The Income Tax
Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1964) (congres-
sional purpose behind the capital gains preference has never been adequately expressed,
although the Supreme Court has assumed the preference is intended to relieve hardship
resulting from income bunching); TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 2 (interpreting legis-
lative history as indicating an attempt to balance equitable and economic considerations).
There is, however, general agreement that economic considerations are the only legiti-
mate justification for capital gains treatment. See, e.g., R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 118
(rev. ed. 1945); Clark, supra note 20, at 1244-45; Note, A Spreading ofReceipts Formula,
supra, at 736-37. For recent discussions of the lock-in effect, see Wetzler, Capital Gains and
Losses, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 115, 135-40 (J. Pechinan ed. 1977); Note,A
Spreading of Receipts Formula, supra, at 737-40. See also Blum, supra note 21, at 256-58
(briefly reviewing the lock-in effect); Miller, supra, at 1068-78 (examining various argu-
ments that capital gains preference is needed to avoid adverse economic repercussions);
Woo, How Far Can Gains Tax Rates Be Cut Without Loss ofRevenue?, 12 TAX NOTES 1027
(1981) (proposing a slight cut in the effective tax rate on long term capital gains, thereby
reducing the lock-in effect, as a means of increasing tax revenues).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 6 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 168, 172-73; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt.
2) C.B. 181, 183-84; Letter from Secretary of the Treasury Andrew W. Mellon to Chairman
Joseph W. Fordney, House Committee on Ways and Means (April 30, 1921), reprinted in
Internal Revenue Hearings Be/ore the Senate Committee on Finance, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. 7,
10-11 (1921) [hereinafter cited as Secretary Letter]. There is a striking parallel between
1921 and today, as evidenced by the original 1921 Senate proposal that capital gains be
taxed at a 40% rate, S. REp. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13 (1921), reprintedin 1939-1
(pt. 2) C.B. 181, 189, the same rate at which they are currently taxed. I.R.C. § 1202(a)
(Supp. V 1981).
26. See Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c)(1), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 1031(a) (1976)) (like-kind exchanges); id. § 202(c)(2), 42 Stat. at 230 (current version at
I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1976) (reorganizations)).
27. See Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462, 470 (1933)
(dicta) (continuity of interest required to defer tax on proceeds from a corporate reorgani-
zation); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1959) (neither
paper gains nor paper losses should be recognized in like-kind exchanges).
19831
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characterizes the history of these two provisions. Like-kind prop-
erty was expansively defined in a manner inconsistent with the
theory that the taxpayer was continuing his prior investment in
the same form.28  The permissive like-kind standard contrasted
with the stricter "similarity" requirement used to determine when
a taxpayer could defer taxes by reinvesting the proceeds of an in-
voluntary conversion.29 The involuntary conversion section sug-
gests continuity of interest, but the expansive definition of like-
kind assets eligible for tax deferral on voluntary exchanges imple-
mented the broader legislative purpose of encouraging economi-
cally desirable exchanges.3" Similarly, the reorganization
provisions were adopted primarily to encourage corporate
restructuring. 31
The subsequent history of the capital gains preference is also
marked by a concern for economic incentives. Not until 1934 did
28. In 1921, tax-deferred like-kind exchanges included exchanges of securities. See
I.T. 1377, 1-2 C.B. 24 (1922); G.C.M. 1637, 6-1 C.B. 166 (1927); see also Greene v. Com-
missioner, 15 B.T.A. 401 (1929), ar'd, 42 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1930). This provision was later
repealed because deductible losses and tax-free gains were too easy to arrange. See Act of
March 4, 1923, Pub. L. No. 545, 42 Stat. 1560; H.R. REP. No. 1432, 67th Cong., 4th Sess.
1-2 (1923), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B. 845, 846. After an initial period of uncertainty,
the exchange of new and used property was also included in like-kind exchanges. See I.T.
2573, 10-1 C.B. 215 (1931), a#g I.T. 2536, 6-1 C.B. 168 (1927), re'g Mim. 3641, 7-1 C.B.
86 (1928), and I.T. 2419, 7-1 C.B. 231 (1928). Current regulations generously define assets
eligible for the like-kind exchange rules. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-l(a), (b) (1982); see
also Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1979).
29. Compare Revenue Act of 1921, § 202(c), 42 Stat. 227, 230 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1031(a) (1976)) (like-kind exchanges), with id. § 214(a)(12), 42 Stat. at 241-42 (cur-
rent version at I.R.C. § 1033(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)) (involuntary conversion). Even the
taxation of boot in like-kind exchanges and involuntary conversion provisions differed.
Compare id. § 202(e), 42 Stat. at 230-31 (current version at I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1976)) (boot is
first applied to recover cost in a like-kind exchange), with id. § 214(a)(12), 42 Stat. at
241-42 (current version at I.R.C. § 1031(d) (1976)) (in involuntary conversion, percentage
of gain equals that percentage of conversion proceeds represented by the boot). In 1924,
Congress established a uniform rule for the taxation of boot, currently codified at I.R.C.
§ 1031(d), regardless of whether the boot is from like-kind exchanges or involuntary con-
versions. See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1924), reprintedin 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 241, 251-52.
30. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 181, 188-89; H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1
(pt. 2) C.B. 168, 175-76. The economic purpose of the like-kind rules is also illustrated by
the examples given to the Senate Finance Committee. Statement of Dr. T.S. Adams, supra
note 23, at 28 (factory-for-factory and security-for-security exchanges).
31. See S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2)
C.B. 181, 188-89.
Although expressing uncertainty as to the historical reason for the reorganization provi-
sions, one commentator notes that their dominant effect is to encourage a select group of
transactions. Sandberg, The Income Tax Subsidy to "'Reorganizations", 38 COLUM. L. REV.
98, 99-102 (1938).
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Congress seriously consider the unfairness of bunching capital
gains at the time of sale. From 1922 through 1933, the tax rate on
capital gains was 12.5%.32 The 1934 Act adopted a different ap-
proach which provided for successively smaller percentages of
capital gains to be included in income as the holding period of the
asset lengthened.3 3 This approach was intended to correct the in-
creasing inequity presumably arising from greater amounts of an-
nual accrued gain being subjected to higher progressive rates in
the year of sale.3 4 This experiment was short-lived, however, be-
cause it increased disincentives to sell. The multi-step reduction
of taxable gain was therefore modified in 1938.31 In 1942, multi-
step reduction was abolished36 and the required holding period
shortened to six months, 37 thus eliminating any pretense of in-
come averaging. The separate policies underlying income averag-
ing for bunched income and the capital gains preference are now
explicitly recognized in Code provisions making capital gains eli-
gible for both special income-averaging benefits and the capital
gains preference.3
32. TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 24.
33. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 117(a), 48 Stat. 680, 714 (current version at I.R.C.
§ 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981)) (establishing five gradations in determining the percentage of
capital gains to be included as income, ranging from 100% inclusion for assets held not
more than one year to 30% inclusion for assets held more than 10 years).
34. See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 25-27; H. SIMONS, supra note 20, at
160-61 (commenting that the 1934 Act made capital gains treatment more progressive).
35. See Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 117(b), 52 Stat. 447, 501 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981)); see also Kent, The Question of Taxing Capital Gains: L
The Casefor Taxation, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 194, 198-99, 205-06 (1940) (acknowl-
edging criticism of the 1934 Act for failing to provide sufficient investment incentives, but
arguing that the 1934 Act needed only to be liberalized in its capital loss treatment to
provide the necessary incentives). See generally Wells, supra note I, at 23-25 (reviewing
legislative history of the 1938 Act's capital gains treatment).
36. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 150(c), 56 Stat. 798, 843 (current version at
§ 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981)) (amending I.R.C. § 117(b) (1938)). See generally Wells, supra
note 1, at 28 (reviewing legislative history of 1942 Act's treatment of capital gains).
37. See Revenue Act of 1942, § 150(a)(1), 56 Stat. at 843 (amending I.R.C. § 117(a)
(1938)). See generally Wells, supra note 1, at 28-29 (reviewing legislative history of 1942
Act's holding period provision).
The holding period was extended to nine months in 1977, and to one year after 1977.
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1402(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1731 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 1222(l)-(4) (Supp. V 1981)). A proposal to reduce the period to six
months passed the Senate in 1982, but did not appear in the final statute. H. CON. REP.
No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 477-78, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1190, 1256-57. The proposal may be revived. See Dole Proposes Six Month Holding Period
for Long-Term Capital Gains, 16 TAx NOTES 887, 887 (1982).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 630, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CoN . & AD. NEws 1645, 1732. Compare I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981) (capital gains
preference) with id. § 1302(a)(1) (1976) (defining averagable income).
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Although the origins of the capital gains preference as a tax
incentive are clear, the conditions for granting the incentive are
less obvious. A pressing concern in 1921 was overcoming obsta-
cles to transferability-often referred to as the lock-in prob-
lem-but two other conditions were important considerations in
the development of judicial doctrine. First, the gain should result
from taking a significant economic risk. The legislative history
contains no explicit discussion of risk as a condition for preferen-
tial treatment, but stimulating economic productivity by encour-
aging the free flow of capital into business enterprises was a
background consideration during the hearings on the Revenue
Act of 1921. 39
Second, the taxpayer entitled to the capital gains preference
should have made a significant investment, either through out-of-
pocket payment, liquidation of other assets, or a commitment of
credit. This criterion, like risk, cannot be attributed to specific
legislative history, but can be inferred both from examples in the
committee reports and the statutory structure. The reports refer to
farms and mineral properties, both of which often involve signifi-
cant investment, as illustrations of capital assets.40 Moreover, the
term "gain" necessarily implies a basis, typically equal to invest-
ment and/or commitment of credit.4' Later statutory develop-
ments also support this inference. The business assets which were
afforded hybrid ordinary-loss/capital-gain treatment in
1942-land and depreciable assets4 2-both require significant in-
vestment. A 1942 House committee report, which ushered in the
modern capital gains structure, suggested that capital gains were
to arise from out-of-pocket payment or liquidation of other
assets.43
The three aspects of the economic incentive-transferability,
risk, and investment-make up the deep structure of the capital
gains preference. Despite their willingness to interpret the statu-
39. See Secretary Letter, supra note 25, at 10-12. Excessive speculation, however, has
not been favored. TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 22-23.
40. H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B.
168, 176; S. REP. No. 275, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1921), reprinted in 1939-1 (pt. 2) C.B.
181, 189. Stock subsequently became a leading example of a capital asset. See A.L.I.,
supra note 4, at 1.
41. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 202(a)-(b), 42 Stat. 227, 229-30 (current ver-
sion at I.R.C. § 1001(a) (Supp. V 1981), § 1012 (1976)).
42. See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 151(b), 56 Stat. 798, 846 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1231(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
43. H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., Ist Sess. 29 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372,
396. See also A.L.I., supra note 4, at 21.
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tory language so as to implement what they perceive to be the
legislative purpose, the courts have not rigorously applied capital
gains doctrine to implement this structure. A recurring question
throughout this Article is whether there might not be good reasons
for this judicial confusion. The judicial process, even in statutory
interpretation, provides an opportunity for policies to thrive or de-
cay, and the confusion which this Article detects may be a sign of
the imminent demise of at least some of the policies underlying
the capital gains preference.
II. TRANSFERABILITY
When the capital gains preference was initially adopted in
1921,4 Congress was concerned primarily with the lock-in effect
caused by imposing ordinary tax rates on the sale of a capital as-
set.45 The ordinary rates were expected to create an excessive bar-
rier to sale and therefore prevent the conversion of capital assets.
Had this concern been pursued seriously, two conditions on eligi-
bility for the capital gains preference would have been imposed.
First, ordinary tax rates would have to pose a significant barrier to
transferring the capital asset. Second, the seller would have to
transfer risks in the sold property. Neither of these conditions has
been rigorously applied.
A. Measuring the Lock-in Effect of Ordinary Tax Rates
Determining whether ordinary tax rates hinder sales requires
comparing the value of the tax on a sale at ordinary rates with the
present value of the tax payable if the asset were retained.46 Any
additional tax due if the asset is retained is the tax payable on
future income (equal to accrued gain).47 Thus, the lock-in effect,
which analyzes the tax consequences of selling versus retaining
the asset, does not depend on accrual of gain long before a sale or
on the progressive tax rate structure, as judicial rhetoric about
bunching tends to suggest.4" The capital gains preference is
designed to prevent bunching offuture income in the year of sale;
44. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 206(b), 42 Stat. 227, 233 (current version at
I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981)).
45. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
46. See A.L.I., supra note 4, at 7-10, 149-52.
47. See id. at 10 n.1.
Throughout this Article it is assumed that the gain realized in an immediate sale of an
asset equals the present value of the future income stream generated by the asset. "Future
income" means income after depreciation, if the income-producing asset is depreciable.
48. See sufpra note 12 and accompanying text.
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this occurs at the time of sale regardless of gradual gain accrual
and the progressive rate structure. The lock-in effect arises from
accelerating the tax due on future income to the year of sale.
When the lock-in effect is analyzed in this way, two factors
emerge which facilitate transferability. First, the present value of
the tax on sale proceeds might be very low because the tax is de-
ferred for a long period. Second, the present value of the tax pay-
able on future income if the asset were retained (equal to accrued
gain) might be very high, either because a short period of future
income is sold or because future income is skewed toward the
years immediately following the sale year. Tax doctrine, however,
has been more concerned with the rhetoric than the reality of the
lock-in effect. Thus, sales of entire investments are eligible for the
capital gains preference even when the income period sold is
short.49 Similarly, the noninterest element of installment sales is
eligible for both capital gains treatment and deferral, 50 even when
deferral substantially mitigates the lock-in effect.5'
If the lock-in effect evoked more serious concern, an effort
would be made to measure the relationship between the tax on the
sale proceeds and the tax on income which would have accrued in
the absence of a sale. When deciding whether to sell an asset, the
taxpayer entertains the option of either paying tax on the gain
now, or retaining the property and paying tax on the income equal
to the gain as it accrues in the future. The lock-in effect is com-
puted by measuring the difference between the present value of
the tax due on sale of the asset, and the present value of the tax
due on future income (equal to accrued gain) which would be
earned if the asset were retained, all divided by the present value
of the tax due on sale.5 z In simplest terms, the formula is
49. See, e.g., Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 971, 979-80 (1959)
(transfer of remaining leasehold interest of 10 months on a 47-year lease held to be a capi-
tal transaction), acq. by Comm'r, 1959-2 C.B. 6, rev'd on other grounds, 282 F.2d 592 (9th
Cir. 1960); Ray v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 438, 441-42 (1952) (transfer of two-and-one-half-
year remaining leasehold interest on five-year lease held to be a capital transaction), a t'd,
210 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954), acq. by Comm'r, 1956-2 C.B.
8.
50. See 2 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 15.01, 15.11 (rev. ed.
1982).
51. See I.R.C. § 453 (West Supp. 1983) (providing for installment method to apply to
installment sales, with no exception in situations where the lock-in effect is reduced); see
also Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 4-5 (periodic payments do not preclude capital gains
treatment).
52. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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_1_ TI.;
-- = 1-
where T, equals the present value of the tax upon sale and T
equals the present value of the tax upon the gain which would
accrue as future income were the asset retained instead of sold.
The amount derived measures, as a fraction of the present value
of the tax on sale,5 3 the extra tax burden resulting from accelerat-
ing tax by selling the property. 4 In the extreme case where the
fixed total yield of an asset is only exhausted over an infinite
number of equal annual payments, the lock-in effect is 100%. In
this case, full tax impact on the gain is felt in the year of sale, and
the future annual income attributable to the retention of the asset
is spread out for so long that the extra tax on any year's income is
negligible. As the number of years of future income declines,
however, the amount of taxable income attributable to each future
year grows, thereby increasing the present value of the tax on that
income (T) and decreasing the lock-in effect. Similarly, when
sale proceeds are taxed over an extended period,55 the present
value of the tax on the sale proceeds (T) declines, thereby reduc-
ing the lock-in effect. If the capital gains preference, which cur-
rently stands at 40% of ordinary rates,56 is taken as defining a
53. Multiplying by 100 gives the lock-in effect as a percentage.
54. See generally A.L.I., supra note 4, at 7-10, 149-52. Another way to understand the
benefit of retaining the asset is to focus on the extra income, after tax, that is earned be-
cause a tax is not paid on a sale. Eventually, the tax which would have been paid at the
time of sale, coupled with a tax on the income it produces, must be paid, but the increased
after-tax earnings are kept by the taxpayer. The present value of those extra earnings
reduces the total burden of the tax due. Thus, the reduced tax burden of retention is the
same whether examined from the perspective of present value of the future taxes or from
the perspective of a reduced tax burden resulting from additional after-tax earnings in the
future. Both methods of computing the lock-in effect produce identical results.
One commentator, however, suggests an entirely different approach. See Note, A
Spreading of Receopts Formula, supra note 24, at 736-48. The author advocates measuring
the lock-in effect by the dispersion of future income flows anticipated at the time of invest-
ment. Id. at 741. If the dispersion exceeds some predetermined period, the sale would
produce capital gains. Id. at 741-42. The suggested time periods, however, are those used
to implement depreciation and assignment-of-income policy, not necessarily lock-in policy.
See id. at 745-46. The author suggests that sale of a uniform 5.2-year income stream
would deserve capital gains. Id. at 745. As Table 1 illustrates, however, that period is too
short to produce an excessive lock-in effect, even if the before-tax riskless discount rate
were 20%. See Table 1, infra text accompanying note 61.
55. This would occur, for example, in the case of an installment sale. See supra notes
50-51 and accompanying text.
56. See I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981). The assumption of a 40%-of-ordinary-rates
capital gains preference is made throughout the Article, although it should be noted that
corporate capital gains are taxed differently. They are subject to a 28% maximum tax, see
19831
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tolerable level of lock-in effect, it follows that the capital gains
preference will be applied only when the lock-in effect resulting
from ordinary tax rates exceeds 40%.
The formula for making these computations is complex."
Nevertheless, assuming that the sale proceeds and the income flow
from the sold property are to be received and taxed in equal an-
nual installments, the number of years of income which must be
id. § 1201(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981), which prevents the 46% top rate, id. § 1l(b)(5) (Supp. V
1981), from applying when corporate income includes capital gains. The preferential rate
on corporate capital gains is therefore 2 46ths, or approximately 60% of the regular rate.
Varying definitions of capital assets to account for different tax entities would be too con-
fusing, however, and the individual rates are therefore used as the norm. This Article also
disregards the effect of the minimum taxes. See I.R.C. §§ 55-56 (West Supp. 1983); id
§ 57(a)(9) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
57. The formula for computing the present value of the tax on sale (Ts), assuming sale
proceeds are received and gain is taxed in equal annual installments, is
(A)
P (I •(+r)i'
i-
where G equals the gain, P equals the number of annual periods over which the sale pro-
ceeds will be received, t equals the tax rate (assumed to be constant), S equals the year in
which payment of the sale proceeds commences (if commencing at the time of sal, S = 0),
s+P-I
r equals the after-tax discount rate (assumed to be constant), and E (Il+r)i
'-S
means the sum of the quantities in the formula with i (the index of time beginning when
payment of sale proceeds commences) increasing from S to (S + P - 1) during periods S to
(S +P - 1).
The formula for computing the present value of the tax on gain as it accrues in the
future (T>), assuming future income is received in equal annual amounts, is
(B3)
YY
" t • (l+r) i
'-I
where G, 1, r, and i have the same meaning as above, Y equals the number of years of
future income sold, and i increases from 1 to Y.
Substituting formula (A) for T, and formula (B) for T,, the general lock-in formula,
Y S 1E (Il+r) i
(I- T  ), equals I- P * ,- (l- r
Y I
(l+r)i
'-S
CAPITAL GAINS
sold before the lock-in effect is excessive becomes readily calcula-
ble, provided the correct discount rate is known. Column A of
Table 1 indicates the minimum number of years of income which
must be sold before the lock-in effect is excessive, assuming that
the 40% capital gains rate sets the standard for an undesirable
lock-in effect, that the ordinary tax rate is 40%, and that the in-
stallment method of reporting income is used. The Table fur-
nishes this data for sale proceeds received in one, five, and ten
equal installments, starting either at the time of sale or one year
thereafter. If future income is skewed toward the early years after
the sale, or if taxation of the sale proceeds is deferred even further,
as in the case of an open transaction,5 8 the number of years of
future income which must be sold before the lock-in effect is ex-
cessive would be even greater. Table 1 reports that figure for
three different situations: Column B assumes that the sale pro-
ceeds are reported on the open transaction method, with gain
recognized after one-half the sale proceeds are collected; Column
C assumes an accelerated receipt of future income at a rate
equivalent to that used to compute double declining balance de-
preciation;59 and Column D assumes a combination of the open
transaction method of Column B, and the accelerated receipt of
If all of the sale proceeds are received at the time of sale, P = 1 and S = 0 and the
general lock-in formula simplifies to
Y
Y (l+r)'
'-I
58. See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412-14 (1931).
59. The problem of determining how future income will be received is analogous to
that of overcoming the presumption of straight line depreciation (in order to justify use of
the income forecast depreciation method) by showing that receipt of income is not expected
in equal annual amounts. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(6)-(7) (1981); see
also Rev. Rul. 78-28, 1978-1 C.B. 61, 61.
Predicting the pattern of future taxable income to be derived from stock is very difficult.
The timing of dividends might depend on shareholder control and, in any event, does not
necessarily follow the pattern of corporate earnings. It seems likely that future taxable
income would be deferred because of shareholder control over dividend distributions. One
workable approach is offsetting the possibility of accelerated income against deferral of
dividend distributions, thereby assuming that future income always accrues to stock in
equal annual amounts, as in Columns A and B of Table 1.
166 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:153
future income of Column C.6"
60. The formulas in note 57, supra, are modified when receipt of income flows and
taxable sale proceeds are not expected in equal annual amounts. In this situation, the pres-
ent value of the tax on sale proceeds (Ts) equals
S+P-I
(1+rY
'-s
where S, P, G, t, r, and i have the same meaning as in note 57, supra, and P%,' is the
percentage of total sale proceeds taxable in year i.
The present value of the tax on gain as it accrues in the future (T,) equals
Y
E G" Y%€°t,
(1+ ry
where Y, G, t, r, and i have the same meaning as in note 57, supra, and Y% is the percent-
age of total future income attributable to year i.
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For example, a sale generating five equal annual installment
payments commencing at sale, when the property is expected to
produce equal annual accruals of future income, would result in
an excessive lock-in effect only if the property produced income
for at least fourteen years, assuming a 20% before-tax discount
rate and a 40% ordinary tax rate. Had the sale been taxed on the
open transaction method with a basis of one-half the sale price, or
had the future income been expected to accrue at the same accel-
erated rate as that used to compute double declining balance de-
preciation, or if these factors were present together, the minimum
number of years of income that would have to be sold before the
lock-in effect became excessive would be seventeen, nineteen, and
twenty-five, respectively. Lower discount rates, later starting dates
for the payments, and extended installment payment periods are
among the factors that further increase the length of time that may
pass before the lock-in effect becomes excessive.62
To use the above analysis as a tool for formulating tax policy,
it is necessary to determine the discount rate for computing the
present value of taxes payable on deferred gain. The after-tax ris-
kless discount rate is the appropriate standard, since it parallels
the return rate on taxpayer investment used to finance future tax
obligations. 63 That rate is a function of the before-tax riskless dis-
count rate and the taxpayer's tax bracket, which must both be de-
termined with certainty prior to the sale if the incentive effects of
the capital gains provisions are to prove functional. Ten-year
Treasury bond interest rates prior to the time of sale, coupled with
the assumption that all taxpayers are in one particular tax bracket,
are useful criteria for achieving the requisite certainty. The fairest
tax bracket assumption would be 40%, as in Table 1. This might
result in a windfall to higher bracket taxpayers since it assumes
greater after-tax returns than that which higher bracket taxpayers
would actually experience. Under the 40% bracket assumption, a
serious lock-in effect occurs on the sale of a shorter period of in-
come than would be the case if the after-tax return had been
lower, because the lock-in effect is greater as after-tax return rates
increase. This windfall, however, may be negligible, because up-
per bracket taxpayers are more likely to invest in riskless tax-ex-
empt bonds, thereby increasing their after-tax return rate.
The converse of a possible upper bracket windfall is serious
62. For example, the comparable figures for a 13.33% before-tax discount rate and a
ten-year installment sale are 25, 33, 34, and 48 years, respectively. See Table 1.
63. A.L.I., supra note 4, at 152.
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lock-in for investors in brackets below 40%. Table 1 does not out-
line this specific effect, because it assumes lower after-tax returns
than those available to low bracket taxpayers. There are few such
investors to worry about, however, except for those whose tax
brackets are artificially lowered through tax preferences. The 40%
tax bracket assumption is therefore a practical compromise.
64
Even if this complex analysis of the lock-in effect were not rig-
64. The following Regulation would implement the policy against excessive lock-in
effect.
Regulation I.1221-X.
(a) Generalrule. Income from the sale of an asset shall not be treated as gain
from the sale of property (and therefore shall be ineligible for capital gains treat-
ment) unless the lock-in effect of the sale exceeds .40, and unless the conditions of
section (f) are met.
(b) Determination of lock-in effect. Except as provided in section (e), the
lock-in effect shall be determined in accordance with Treasury Tables based on
the simplified formula in section (d)(ii). [See Table 1, supra text accompanying
note 50, for an illustration]. For purposes of this formula, it is assumed that the
taxpayer is in the 40% tax bracket. The discount rate is the average monthly
interest rate paid on ten-year Treasury bonds. The average monthly interest rate
shall be the mean of the six most recent monthly interest rates published by the
Treasury more than three months prior to the date of sale. Because this simplified
formula assumes equal annual receipt of both sale proceeds and future income,
section (e) provides for direct application of the basic lock-in determination
formula for computing the lock-in effect.
(c) Definition of time period of income sold. For purposes of applying the
lock-in determination formula, the time period of income sold shall be the
number of years of income sold, determined as follows:
Sale agreement Time period of income
Carved-out income interest for sped- Time period specified in contract
fled time period
Carved-out income interest not for Time within which receipt of all
specified time period income to be produced by the asset
can reasonably be expected
Entire asset sold Time within which receipt of all
income to be produced by the asset
can reasonably be expected
(d) Lock-in determination formula.
(i) Basicformula. The basic formula for computing the lock-in effect is
(I - 2-). T, and T are determined as follows:
Tr G - Y ' and(I + ry
i-I
S+P-I.
r = G - P%i1 t
(I +ry
i-S
where G equals gain, Y equals the time period of income sold, t equals the
tax rate, r equals the after-tax discount rate, S equals the annual period when
payment of the sale proceeds begins (S equals 0 at time of sale), P equals the
number of annual periods in which sale proceeds are received, Y%j equals
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orously incorporated into judicial doctrine, it nonetheless fur-
nishes a background consideration for judicial interpretation of
capital gains policy by casting doubt on the fairness of combining
deferral and capital gains. For example, recent Treasury reg-
ulations concerning the installment method of reporting gain for-
bid the use of the open transaction method of reporting income
(whereby taxpayers may both defer tax until the cost of the sold
asset is recovered and receive capital gains) except in extraordi-
nary circumstances involving contingent payments. 5 Instead, the
value of the fixed payment obligation is used to determine capital
gain in the year of sale, thereby closing the transaction for tax
purposes, absent the election of the installment method.6 6 Be-
the percentage of income received in year i, and .P%, equals the percentage of
sale proceeds taxable in year i.
(ii) Simpl#Fedformula. The following simplified formula, which is de-
rived from the above formula, assumes that taxable sale proceeds and antici-
pated future income flow are received in equal annual installments:
Y
(l+r) 1
Y S+P-I
(l+r) i
'-S
(e) Direct application of the basic formula.
(i) If the taxpayer demonstrates that the taxable sale proceeds or antici-
pated income flow from an asset will not be received in equal annual
amounts, so that the lock-in effect as determined in subsection (d)(i) of this
Regulation exceeds .40, then any gain resulting from the sale of the asset
shall be treated as income from the sale of property (and therefore eligible
for capital gains treatment), provided the gain would otherwise be capital
gain under these Regulations and by statute. The standard of proof required
of the taxpayer to overcome the presumption of equal anticipated income
flow shall parallel that required of the taxpayer seeking to utilize the income
forecast method of depreciation. [See Temp. Treas. Reg. 15a.453-1(c)(6)-(7)
(1981).]
(ii) If the government demonstrates that the taxable sale proceeds or
anticipated income flow from an asset will not be received in equal annual
amounts, so that the lock-in effect as determined in subsection (d)(1) of this
Regulation does not exceed .40, then the sale of the asset shall not be treated
as the sale of property and afforded capital gains treatment. For this pur-
pose, the taxpayer will be presumed to be in the 40% tax bracket. The gov-
ernment's burden of proof in this regard is a preponderance of the evidence.
(f) Carved-out income interests. If the sale is of a carved-out income interest,
the sale shall not be eligible for capital gains treatment unless the seller elects to
accrue income to the retained remainder interest in accordance with § 1.446-X of
these Regulations [see infra note 159].
65. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d) (1981). But see Goldberg, Open Transaction
Treatmentfor Deferred Payment Sales After the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAX LAW.
605, 648-49 (1981) (the regulation should not be authoritative since it is inconsistent with
I.R.C. § 453 (Supp. V 1981) as well as judicial precedent).
66. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(iii) (1981). The value cannot be less than the
CA4PITAL GAINS
cause these regulations prevent simultaneous deferral and capital
gains treatment, they should be upheld.
Similar considerations suggest that a recent amendment to sec-
tion 453 allowing use of the installment method for contingent
payment sales 67 is likely to curtail the use of the open transaction
method. Prior to this amendment, the government disallowed in-
stallment reporting when payments were contingent. 68 The open
transaction method, combining excessive deferral and capital
gains, was therefore the only alternative to taxing the seller on the
value of the contingent obligations in the year of sale, despite val-
uation uncertainties and the lack of cash with which to pay the
tax.69 By allowing the installment method alternative, pressure to
permit the open transaction method should be greatly reduced.
B. Transf/erring Risks
The second requirement which should be satisfied if the capi-
tal gains preference is to prevent a serious lock-in effect is that the
seller transfer risks in the sold property to the buyer. The courts
have implemented this policy by applying the retained income
doctrine to sales in which the proceeds are contingent upon the
profitability of the sold asset. Under the doctrine, the contingent
payment transaction is deemed not to be a disposition by sale or
exchange, and therefore no capital gain is recognized.70 However,
value of the property sold. Id. This eliminates the equivalent-of-cash doctrine, see id. at
(d)(2)(i), under which only the market value of the installment obligations would be taxed
in the year of sale. See 2 J. MERTENS, supra note 44, at § 11.03. When the value of the
obligation in the sale year was taxed under the equivalent-of-cash doctrine, future collec-
tions in excess of the expected cash equivalent were taxed as ordinary income. However,
the taxpayer was able to defer tax on the collections until the entire basis in the installment
obligation was recovered, and was not obligated to allocate collections between cost and
ordinary income. See infra note 92.
67. I.R.C. § 453j)(2) (West Supp. 1983); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-
l(d)(2)(iii) (1981).
68. S. REP. No. 1000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4696, 4717.
69. Although allowance of the cost recovery/open transaction method for contingent
payment sales is likely to decline, there is still something anomalous about allowing capital
gains on deferred contingent payments by permitting use of the installment method. The
government's only weapon against this is to deny that a sale has occurred. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(1) (1981).
70. See, e.g., Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655, 659-60 (1937). But see, e.g., Commis-
sioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 570, 576-77 (1965).
Denying that a sale has occurred when income is retained should not be confused with
denying capital gains because there has been no sale of a capital asset. The distinction
between disposition and sale is difficult to justify, see generally A.L.I., supra note 4, at 15,
but the distinction between sale and retained income goes to the heart of the capital gains
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the retained income doctrine has been inconsistently applied. Sale
proceeds contingent upon the exploitation of a sold franchise,
trade name, or trademark are treated as ordinary income,7 while
similar payments in the nature of royalties are treated as capital
gains if the taxpayer disposes of substantially all his rights in the
property.72 The sale of passive investments for a share of invest-
ment income produces ordinary income,7 3 but the sale of a con-
trolling business interest to a tax-exempt organization in return
for a share of the profits produces capital gain74 unless the sale
price exceeds the value of the property.7 5 Moreover, when the sale
price to a tax-exempt organization exceeds the fair market value
of the business, that portion of the sale proceeds which represents
the difference between the fair market value and the basis might
be eligible for long term capital gains treatment.76
policy dealing with transferability. For a discussion of the denial of capital gains for dispo-
sitions which are not sales, see infra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
71. I.R.C. § 1253(c) (1976).
72. Id. § 1235(a)(2) (Supp. V 1981) (patents); Rev. Rul. 60-226, 1960-1 C.B. 26, 27
(copyrights). See also Dreymann v. Commissioner, II T.C. 153, 162-63 (1948) (no require-
ment that sale proceeds be received in lump sum).
73. See, e.g., Silverstein v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1106, 1109-10 (N.D. Ill. 1968)
(no capital gains preference allowed where remainderman continued to make annual pay-
ments to life beneficiary); Lazarus v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 854, 873 (1972) (transfer of
stock to foreign situs trust with reservation of right to $75,000 of annual income produced
ordinary income), aj'd, 513 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1975); Hrobon v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.
476, 497 (1964) (net distributions from trust held to be ordinary income); Rev. Rul. 68-183,
1968-I C.B. 308, 309 (transfer of stock to a trust where grantor still received annual pay-
ments yielded ordinary income); see also Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co.,
301 F.2d 654, 657-58 (10th Cir. 1962) (taxpayer's relinquishment of right to issue subli-
censes in return for percentage of royalties from third party licensees produced ordinary
income); Voloudakis v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 209, 212 (9th Cir. 1960) (taxpayers who
transferred use of leased building and retained right to repossess on default were required
to treat payments received as ordinary income); Warren v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 846,
849 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (sale of stock to another corporation for cash and overriding gas and oil
royalties resulted in ordinary income).
74. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 570-73; Allen v. Commissioner, 34
T.CM. (CCH) 242, 258-62 (1975); see also Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911, 912 (2d
Cir. 1948). In Carter, a majority shareholder who had owned her shares for more than ten
years received, upon dissolution of the corporation, oil brokerage contracts of unascertain-
able value. The Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court, 9 T.C. 364 (1947), and held that
$35,000 subsequently realized from commissions on the brokerage contracts was taxable as
long term capital gain.
75. See Rev. Rul. 66-153, 1966-1 C.B. 187, 188.
76. See, e.g., Berenson v. Commissioner, 507 F.2d 262, 268 (2d Cir. 1974). The subse-
quent history of Berenson illustrates the difficulty of apportioning sale proceeds between
ordinary income and capital gain. See 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 415, 417-18 (1978), rev'd and
remanded, 612 F.2d 695, 699-701 (2d Cir. 1979). Giving capital gains treatment to retained
income is inconsistent with I.R.C. § 1239(a) (Supp. V 1981), which taxes as ordinary in-
come the gain from sale of a depreciable asset to a related party. In both situations, future
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The obvious reluctance to apply the retained income doctrine
rigorously may be due partly to the difficulty of applying uncer-
tain risk-shifting criteria. The risk-shifting standard requires that
the seller transfer his risk in the sold asset in order to qualify for
the capital gains preference. The situation is analogous to distin-
guishing between debt and equity,77 because in both cases the
seller is claiming that he is extending credit instead of retaining an
ownership interest. Determining whether the seller is a creditor or
the owner of a retained interest requires establishing whether the
buyer's indebtedness to the seller is the equivalent of the seller's
having retained an interest in the sold property.78 A risk-shifting
standard would require separating transactions into sale and re-
tained income components whenever the seller receives both a
cash downpayment and a profit participation;7 9 otherwise courts
must make a case-by-case determination whether the downpay-
ment is sufficient to justify capital gains treatment for the entire
sale proceeds. Moreover, courts may be reluctant to take these
steps for fear of discouraging economically desirable sales.8"
Administrative and economic reasons do not entirely explain
the underdevelopment of the retained income doctrine. The
courts' failure to develop the doctrine can also be traced to an
incomplete understanding of the lock-in problem. Courts have
freely assumed that past accrued gain justifies preferential tax
rates,8' even though receipt of sale proceeds is similar to retention
of the asset. Yet, at the very least, one would readily expect denial
of the capital gains preference when both an income interest is
retained and most of the payments are long deferred. Both cir-
cumstances are likely to be present when the unpaid purchase
price exceeds the value of the asset; in such cases there is no justi-
fication for allocating sale price between retained income interest,
income is retained within a single economic unit. See also I.R.C. § 341(a), (e)(4)(C) (1976)
(applying collapsible corporation rules to liquidations of depreciable property, even though
sale of the stock would result in capital gain).
77. Cf. I.R.C. § 385 (1976) (setting forth factors to be considered in distinguishing
debt from equity).
78. Cf. LeTulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1940) (payment for all assets of
corporation in bonds, even though secured solely by the purchased assets, gave rise to
creditor status for buyer, and seller retained no proprietary interest in enterprise; transac-
tion was thus deemed "sale or exchange" and not reorganization).
79. Allocating basis between the sale and retained income elements of a transaction
creates another potential problem. The simplest method is to allocate basis entirely to the
sale, and avoid amortizing any of the basis against the retained income interest.
80. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. at 575.
81. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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taxable as ordinary income, and sale proceeds, taxable as capital
gains.82
Thus far, this Article has suggested that the failure to apply the
lock-in criteria rigorously is attributable either to complexity or to
faulty analysis. A third explanation for this failure is suggested by
the following example. Assume that a $50,000 investment in a
risky venture entitles a taxpayer to a fixed dollar return of $10,000,
payable out of future profits if and when they materialize. Upon
materialization, but prior to collection of the profits, the taxpayer
sells his claim. Case law supports the taxpayer's right to capital
gains treatment on the sale83 but analysis of the lock-in effect does
not. When income will be realized so shortly after the sale, the
difference between taxing the sale proceeds and taxing the re-
tained income at ordinary rates would probably be so negligible
that the lock-in effect is minimal, eliminating the need for capital
gains treatment. If this seems a startling result, it may be a sign of
the waning influence of the lock-in effect as a rationale for the
capital gains preference.8 4
III. GAIN ACCRUAL By RISK VERSUS
GAIN ACCRUAL By TIME
A taxpayer must take risks to be eligible for the capital gains
preference. The most important doctrine implementing this pol-
icy is the disallowance of the capital gains preference when the
accrual is due merely to the passage of time.8 5 The leading case
articulating the doctrine86 deals with original issue discount,87
82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. For a discussion of whether retained
ordinary income should be offset by depreciation deductions, see infra note 141.
83. See, e.g., Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 419, 425 (1953).
But see Pounds v. United States, 372 F.2d 342, 351 n.7 (5th Cir. 1967) (no "sale or ex-
change" in a transaction involving sale of a right to proceeds).
84. Judicial reluctance to apply the lock-in criteria to deny capital gains on the sale of
a successful risk) investment does not necessarily undermine the general applicability of
the lock-in criteria. The taxpayer who holds a risky investment for a long period is not in
the same position as one whose risky future income flow is likely to arise, if at all, soon
after the investment is made. Case law has always been sympathetic to the investor whose
original investment purpose persists for a long time, as evidenced by decisions that have
considered original investment purpose relevant despite evidence that the sale may have
been in the ordinary course of business. See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States,
526 F.2d 409, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1976).
85. See United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 58 (1965).
86. See de Kosmian, Original Issue Discount, 22 TAX LAWYER 339, 339 (1969).
87. Seeidseealso Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658, 660 (3d Cir. 1961); Stanton v.
Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1, 6 (1960). But see Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482, 484
(6th Cir. 1944). See generally de Kosmian, supra note 86; Wolf, Original Issue Discount:
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whereby the borrower agrees to repay more than he borrows in
exchange for a reduced interest rate. The gain equal to the dis-
count which accrues to the lender in lieu of interest is ordinary
income." Similarly, gain on the sale of life insurance policies89
and annuities9" is ordinary income when it merely represents ac-
crued interest. In contrast, gain attributable to defaulted interest
realized after purchasing an outstanding debt,9' and gain derived
from an investment in a promise to pay a fixed sum out of specu-
lative profits92 is eligible for the capital gains preference.
Before andAfter National Alfalfa, 28 TAX LAWYER 325 (1975) (reviewing the judicial and
legislative treatment of original issue discount).
88. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. at 57-58.
89. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33, 35-37 (4th Cir. 1960) (taxpayer
sold policy 12 days before maturity; gain was taxed at ordinary rates); Nesbit v. Commis-
sioner, 43 T.C. 629, 629-32 (1965) (gain on endowment policies was ordinary income);
Barrett v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 993, 998-99 (1964), affid, 348 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1965);
Jones v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 404, 409-10 (1962) (portion of gain from assignment of
endowment policy which accrued prior to sale was ordinary income); Crocker v. Commis-
sioner, 37 T.C. 605, 610-13 (1962); Roffv. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 818, 823-25 (1961), aI'd,
304 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1962).
90. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 587, 589 (8th Cir. 1962);
Arnfeld v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 865, 870 (Ct. Cl. 1958). But Gf. Paine v. Commis-
sioner, 236 F.2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1956), reJ g 23 T.C. 391, 403 (1954) (capital gains treat-
ment where installment sale for amount in excess of fair market value did not contain
disguised interest).
91. See, e.g., Rickaby v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 886, 891-92 (1957); Rev. Rul. 60-284,
1960-2 C.B. 464, 465.
92. See, e.g., Lubin v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 209, 213 (2d Cir. 1964) (difference
between loan and face value of notes treated as gain on investment acquired with loan
proceeds); Pacific Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) at 4-25 (sale of fixed-
dollar claim to risky movie profits produced capital gain).
The concept of risk is also used to determine whether collection of a debt acquired from
a creditor at a discount is first a recovery of capital or is part capital and part income.
When the risk is very great, the proceeds are generally treated as a recovery of cost. Com-
pare Willhoit v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 259, 263-64 (9th Cir. 1962) (cost recovery), rev'g
17 T.C.M. (CCH) 1024 (1958); Phillips v. Frank, 295 F.2d 629, 633-34 (9th Cir. 1961)
(same), with Ehlers v. Vinal, 382 F.2d 58, 62-63 (8th Cir. 1967) (allocation between interest
and principal); Darby Inv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 839, 844-45 (1962) (same), a1 7'd
per curiam, 315 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 64-162, 1964-1 (pt. 1) C.B. 304, 304-05
(same).
A similar risk-based distinction is made when the debt consists of taxable sale proceeds.
When collection is very risky at the time the debt is acquired, the cost of the debt, which
equals the value at which it was included in income, is recovered first. See, e.g., Phillips v.
Frank, 295 F.2d at 633-34; Underhill v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 489, 492 (1966). But see
Waring v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 800, 801 (3d Cir. 1969) (cost recovery method used by
taxpayer was accepted by government without regard to risk, so that all collections after
cost had been recovered were taxable as ordinary income). The amount of ordinary in-
come first recoverable as cost by deferring taxable gain until debt collections exceed cost
has been greatly reduced by two recent amendments to the Code and Regulations. First, it
is less likely that debt will be taxed when received because the installment method is avail-
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Determining whether the risk level is sufficient to justify capi-
tal gains treatment may prove difficult in individual cases. The
difficulty stems from the same problems that arise in distinguish-
ing debt from equity and in other circumstances requiring defini-
tional distinction between creditor and owner status.93 Arbitrary
line-drawing where important tax consequences are at stake
strains these definitions. Nevertheless, risk is a relevant criterion
for determining whether capital gains treatment is appropriate.
The problem is one of application, not theory.
Conversely, application of the sale of a carved-out interest
doctrine94 is simple-whenever a property owner sells a right to
income for a lesser duration than his own, he is taxed at ordinary
rates on the proceeds from the sale of the carved-out interest.95
This doctrine originated in the early case of Burnet v. Harmel,96
and was more recently formulated in Commissioner v. Gillette Mo-
tor Transport, Inc.97 and Commissioner v. P.. Lake, Inc.98 These
decisions are markedly deficient in legal or policy justifications.
Harmel was decided on the ground that no "sale" had occurred,99
while Gillette turned on a denial that "property" had been sold."
The P.C. Lake Court seemed to hold that a sale or exchange of a
capital asset cannot take place if the sale proceeds are the
equivalent of future income.' 01
able regardless of the amount of consideration received in the year of sale, or whether the
payments are contingent. See I.R.C. § 453(a) (Supp. V 1981); Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 15a.453-1(a), (c)(1) (1981). Under the installment method, the collection of the debt is
treated as part recovery of capital, part gain, and part interest. Second, if the installment
method is not used, the value of the debt is taxable sale proceeds in the year of sale, except
in rare cases involving contingent payments. Taxable value equals the value of the prop-
erty exchanged for the debt, and the equivalent-of-cash doctrine is not applied to discount
the value of the debt. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(d)(2)(i). Taxing the debt at a
higher figure than that permitted by the equivalent-of-cash doctrine results in more cost
and less future income to be deferred through use of the cost recovery method.
93. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385 (1976); see also Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S.
561, 572-73 (1978) (in sale-and-leaseback transaction, purchaser-lessor can claim deprecia-
tion only if deemed owner of property and not lessee's creditor).
94. See, e.g., I.T. 4003, 1950-1 C.B. 10, 11; see generally Lyon & Eustice,Assignment of
Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P.G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REv. 295 (1962)
(discussing the judicial and legislative tax treatment of income assignments).
95. Id.
96. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
97. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
98. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
99. 287 U.S. at 107.
100. 364 U.S. at 134-35.
101. 356 U.S. at 266 ("consideration was paid for the right to receive future income");
see also Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941) ("substitute for rental payments");
Harmel, 287 U.S. at 108 ("like payments of rent").
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P.G. Lake illustrates the problematical nature of the sale of a
carved-out interest doctrine. To deny capital gains solely because
a right to future income has been sold completely undermines the
rationale behind the capital gains preference because all sale pro-
ceeds are the present value of the future income to be derived
from the property.' 2 However, P. G. Lake is not entirely wrong.
When a carved-out interest is sold, some future income should be
taxed as ordinary income, and that is the gain accruing due to the
mere passage of time. When a seller carves out an income interest
he carves out a remainder interest as well. The value of the re-
mainder interest is discounted to account for the absence of in-
come between the sale of the carved-out interest and the
expiration of that interest. The remainder interest value increases
over time until vesting as a function of the diminishing carved-out
interest period. This increase in value is the future income that
should be taxed as ordinary income, given its similarity to the gain
realized in an original issue discount. 10 3
To understand the advantages of the foregoing analysis, con-
sider the taxpayer who invests $100 in corporate stock. The $100
cost stems from the following assumptions: $20 expected annual
before-tax income in perpetuity,1 " a 20% before-tax discount rate
for riskless long term investment, and a 50% tax rate. The $100
cost equals the expected after-tax income ($10) divided by the af-
ter-tax discount rate (10%).105 The curious treatment of the sale of
a carved-out interest is illustrated by an example whereby the
seller of a capital asset is taxed even though he has realized no
gain because market forces-either expected income flow or inter-
est rate-have not changed. We will therefore assume that the
taxpayer who has purchased $100 of corporate stock carves out
102. E.g., P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 266, United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56, 59
(5th Cir. 1963) ("sale was not merely the present sale of the right to be paid in the future,
. . . [but was the sale of] an asset, a right, a property which could produce income"); see
also Note, A Spreading of Receofls Formula, supra note 24, at 732-33 (present value dis-
count factor must reflect risks attendant to retaining asset).
103. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
104. The $20 expected annual income figure is the weighted average of all possible
payouts, adjusted for the investor's risk aversion and for dispersion of the payouts around
the average payout. Risk is therefore accounted for in the income figure, not in the dis-
count rate. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CoRPoRATE FINANCE 59-70 (2d ed.
1979) (certainty equivalent method of valuation).
105. The initial cost is independent of the tax rate because changes in the tax rate create
offsetting changes in both the after-tax income and after-tax discount rate. For example, a
40% instead of a 50% tax rate results in $12 after-tax income (not $10) divided by a 12%
after-tax discount rate (not 10%), which also equals $100.
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and sells a ten-year income flow to a buyer with the same charac-
teristics as the seller, and that market forces remain static. In this
scenario, the price for the ten-year income flow will be $83.85,
which represents the present value of ten years' income after de-
preciation,10 6 assuming a $20 expected annual return before tax
and depreciation and a 20% before-tax discount rate. 0 7 These as-
sumptions provide insight into what happens to the retained re-
mainder interest. Gain will accrue to the remainder at a 20%
before-tax rate, compounded annually on the remainder's value at
the time of sale-an annual increment which equals the carved-
out asset's annual depreciation while in the buyer's hands. 08 Ta-
ble 2 presents these figures.
106. The sinking fund method of depreciation is used, resulting in higher net income
allocable to the earlier years of the asset's life. See generally M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 136-37 (3d ed. 1982); Blum, Accelerated Depreciation A Proper Allow-
ancefor Measuring Net Income?!!, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1172, 1174-81 (1980). A different
depreciation method for tax purposes would change the annual after-tax return and could
therefore affect the purchase price of the income interest. Sinking fund depreciation com-
plements the accrual of income to the remainder interest at compound interest rates. The
compound interest accrual method, which results in less income accruing in the earlier
years, has recently been adopted for computing original issue discount. See Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, § 231(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1232A(a)(1), (3) (West Supp.
1983).
107. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
108. The most controversial aspect of these assumptions is that future income is ex-
pected to accrue in equal annual amounts. Similar questions have arisen in computing tax
depreciation: instead of assuming equal annual income, which would result in sinking fund
depreciation, the government permits the more generous straight line depreciation method
because it is simple to administer. See Blum, supra note 106, at 1183-84. The justification
for allowing straight line depreciation appears to be that, given the uncertainty of future
income, the equal annual income assumption is not so superior that administrative ease
should be sacrificed. See id. Nonetheless, the equal annual income assumption is the most
reasonable if its administrative difficulties can be surmounted. This Article will therefore
employ that assumption in discussing the correct taxation of the buyer of the carved-out
income interest and the owner of the retained remainder interest; issues of administrability
will be discussed later. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 2
BEFORE-TAx RETURN TO TEN-YEAR INCOME AND RETAINED
REMAINDER INTERESTS, ASSUMING $20 BEFORE-TAX EXPECTED
RETURN, 20% BEFORE-TAx RISKLESs DISCOUNT RATE, AND
SINKING FUND DEPRECIATION
Total Expected Income Accruing to Income Accruing to
Before-Tax $83.85 Investment in $16.15 Investment*
Return Income Interest in Remainder
Year Depreciation Income
1 $ 20 $ 3.23 $ 16.77 $ 3.23
2 20 3.88 16.12 3.88
3 20 4.65 15.35 4.65
4 20 5.58 14.42 5.58
5 20 6.70 13.30 6.70
6 20 8.04 11.96 8.04
7 20 9.65 10.36 9.65
8 20 11.57 8.43 11.57
9 20 13.89 6.11 13.89
10 20 16.67 3.33 16.67
Total $200 $83.85 $116.16 $83.85
* $16.15 is what remains of the $100 original investment cost after subtracting the
$83.85 cost allocable to the income interest.
Thus, when a taxpayer with a $100 investment sells ten years' in-
come for $83.85,109 the carved-out income interest doctrine pro-
duces the following results: (1) the sale proceeds are ordinary
income;"10 (2) the buyer acquires a depreciable income interest;"'
and (3) the retained remainder interest has a $100 basis."12
A more obvious method would be to allocate to the carved-out
income interest its proportionate share of the underlying asset's
basis, just as a sold portion of any property is allocated its share of
the total property's basis." 3 Under this method, assuming static
109. See supra text accompanying note 106.
110. See, e.g., P.G. Lake, 356 U.S. at 265-66; Shafer v. United States, 204 F. Supp. 473,
475-76 (S.D. Ohio 1962), aft'd, 312 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1963).
111. See Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253, 256 (7th Cir. 1954) (taxpayer permitted to
recover cost of life estates by use of ratable annual deductions from amounts received sub-
sequent to purchase); Fry v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 522, 526-27 (1958) (taxpayers allowed
to amortize amounts paid for life income interests in a trust), a]7'd, 283 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.
1960).
112. The entire basis should be allocated to the remainder interest if a portion of the
basis is denied to the owner of an income interest. But cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-8(c) (1957)
(when remainderman purchases his interest and subsequently dies, remainderman's trans-
feree loses opportunity to adjust basis upward due to passage of time.
113. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957).
1983]
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market forces stabilize the underlying asset's value, the $83.85 sale
proceeds would be offset by an equal amount of basis" 4 and no
gain would accrue. The same result follows under the statute
when a donee of a carved-out interest sells his interest at the same
time the donee of the remainder interest sells his,13 5 or when a
bondholder sells a carved-out income interest."t 6 Why, then, does
114. The basis of the carved-out interest would be calculated by dividing the value of
the carved-out interest by the value of the entire asset, and multiplying this fraction by the
total cost. If the asset from which the income interest was carved was expected to produce
equal annual income flows in perpetuity and the carved-out income interest was for a fixed
period of years, a table based on the before-tax riskless discount rate prevailing at the time
of sale can be devised to specify that percentage of total cost attributable to the basis of the
carved-out interest. Table 3, infra, provides those percentages for discount rates of 8%,
10%, 12%, 15%, and 20%, respectively.
If the income interest is for an unspecified duration, receipt of income is not expected in
equal annual amounts, or the asset from which the interest was carved is not a perpetual
income interest, the table would not be accurate. Instead, the basis formula must be ap-
plied. Determining the value of the entire asset may be difficult. When the income interest
is carved out of an asset which is not expected to produce income perpetually, the proce-
dure described infra note 150 can be used to compute this value. When the carved-out
income interest does not extend over a fixed period of years, or when equal annual income
is not expected, the value of the entire interest would have to be estimated.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COST ATTRIBUTABLE TO INCOME INTEREST, DEPENDING ON
DISCOUNT RATE IN YEAR OF SALE
Discount Rate
Length of Income Interest in Years 8% 10% 12% 15% 20%
1 7.41 9.09 10.71 13.04 16.67
2 14.27 17.36 20.28 24.39 30.56
3 20.62 24.87 28.82 34.25 42.13
4 26.50 31.70 36.45 42.82 51.77
5 31.94 37.91 43.26 50.28 59.81
6 36.98 43.55 49.34 56.77 66.51
7 41.65 48.68 54.77 62.41 72.09
8 45.97 53.35 59.61 67.31 76.74
9 49.98 57.59 63.94 71.57 80.62
10 53.68 61.45 67.80 75.28 83.85
11 57.11 64.95 71.25 78.51 86.54
12 60.29 68.14 74.33 81.31 88.78
13 63.23 71.03 77.08 83.75 90.65
14 65.95 73.67 79.54 85.87 92.21
15 68.48 76.06 81.73 87.71 93.51
16 70.81 78.24 83.69 89.31 94.59
17 72.97 80.22 85.44 90.71 95.49
18 74.98 82.01 87.00 91.92 96.24
19 76.83 83.65 88.39 92.97 96.87
20 78.55 85.14 89.63 93.89 97.39
115. I.R.C. § 1001(e)(3) (1976).
116. Id. § 1232B(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the defects in the rules
applicable to sale of an income interest in a bond, see infra notes 151-55 and accompany-
ing text.
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the sale of a carved-out interest doctrine require taxing the entire
sale proceeds as ordinary income?
The answer is grounded on policy-the doctrine thwarts tax
evasion. When basis is allocated to the carved-out income inter-
est, it becomes highly improbable that the remainderman will re-
port the gain accruing to his interest as ordinary income. A
similar problem in the original issue discount context 17 resulted
in statutory changes providing for the annual accrual of original
issue discount as ordinary income"1 ' and enlisting the aid of the
third-party corporate borrower in reporting and collecting the tax
on that income.' 9 However, no third party exists to facilitate tax
reporting and collection when gain accrues to a remainder inter-
est. Thus, a simple solution to the problem of taxing the remain-
derman's gain might appear from the fact that the sale proceeds
equal the amount of income expected to accrue to the seller as
remainderman, assuming stable market forces. The simple solu-
tion is to tax the sales proceeds as ordinary income in the year of
sale, which is exactly what the sale of a carved-out income interest
doctrine does. The proceeds from the sale of a carved out income
interest are indeed future income, but are taxed before their ac-
crual to the remainderman in order to solve a difficult administra-
tive problem.
This analysis puts the doctrine's validity at issue. To be sure,
the analogy between original issue discount and gain accruing to a
discounted remainder interest is not perfect; the remainder inter-
est might be in property such as land or stock, which fluctuates in
value, whereas original issue discount arises on debt, a fixed-dol-
lar obligation. Of course, fluctuation in value does not by itself
prevent accrual of ordinary income, as reflected in the taxing of
original issue discount despite fluctuation in the value of the
debt.' 20 Fluctuating value might more seriously hinder the taxing
of accrued income, however, when the obligation is not a promise
to pay a fixed sum. The investor in a fixed-sum obligation will
receive the total amount accrued as ordinary income.' 2' When
the investment is contingent on profits, however, the remainder-
117. See H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1758.
118. See I.R.C. § 1232A (West Supp. 1983).
119. See id. § 6049(a)(1), (d)(6) (1976 & West Supp. 1983) (reporting); id. §§ 3451(a),
3455(b) (West Supp. 1983) (collection).
120. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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man is less certain to realize the amount accrued without any
change occurring in the value of the underlying property.
Assume, for example, that the expected before-tax return on
the stock in the above scenario 122 has increased from $20 to $24
per year, while the riskless before-tax discount rate remains 20%.
The total value of the underlying investment would increase to
$120, the income interest would sell for $100.62, 123 and the value
of the remainder interest would equal $19.38.124 Given no further
change in the rate of return or in the discount rate, income total-
ling $100.62 would accrue over ten years to the $19.38 remainder
interest at an expected before-tax rate of return of 20%, com-
pounded annually.125 Yet, should the income prospects or interest
122. See supra text accompanying notes 104-07.
123. 83.85% of $120 equals $100.62. See Table 3, supra note 114.
124. $120 minus $100.62 equals $19.38.
125. Table 4a, infra, adapts Table 2,supra text accompanying note 108, to a $24 before-
tax return and a $100.62 cost for the income interest. All other assumptions are the same as
those in Table 2. Gain on sale of the income interest is $16.77 ($100.62 minus $83.85). The
remainderman's basis would increase by the income accruing to that interest at a 20% com-
pound annual interest rate ($16.15 plus $100.62 of taxable income equals $116.77). Assum-
ing no further change in value, the remainderman would own an investment worth $120
after ten years, with an as yet unrealized gain of $3.23. In contrast, Table 4b presents the
figures for a $30 expected before-tax return and a 27.1% discount rate. The value of the
income interest is virtually the same as when the expected return is $24 and the discount
rate is only 20%. However, the annual income computations are different. Gain on the
sale of the income interest is computed using a $90.91 basis, and equals $9.73 ($100.64
minus $90.91). The remainderman's basis increases to $109.73 ($9.09 plus $100.64 of taxed
income). Assuming no further change in value, after ten years the remainderman would
own an investment worth $110.70, with an unrealized gain of $.97.
TABLE 4a
BEFORE-TAX RETURN TO TEN-YEAR INCOME AND REMAINDER INTERESTS ASSUMING
$24 BEFORE-TAX EXPECTED RETURN, 20% BEFORE-TAX RisKLEs DISCOUNT RATE,
AND SINKING FUND DEPRECIATION
Total Income Accruing to Income Accruing to
Expected Before- $100.62 Investment in $16.15 Investment
Tax Return Income Interest in Remainder
Year Depreciation Income
1 $ 24 $ 3.88 $ 20.12 $ 3.88
2 24 4.65 19.35 4.65
3 24 5.58 18.42 5.58
4 24 6.70 17.30 6.70
5 24 8.04 15.96 8.04
6 24 9.65 14.36 9.65
7 24 11.57 12.43 11.57
8 24 13.89 10.11 13.89
9 24 16.67 7.34 16.67
10 24 20.00 4.00 20.00
Total $240 $100.62 $139.38 $100.62
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rates change after sale of the income interest, the value of the un-
derlying asset upon expiration of the interest will not have in-
creased by the amount predicted on the premise that market
forces would remain static. The question therefore becomes
whether it is fair to tax the gain accruing to the remainder interest
as ordinary income when the underlying asset's value upon expi-
ration of the income interest is subject to such uncertainty.1 26
Taxing this gain as ordinary income is not unfair, however,
because the analogy between income accruing to the remainder
interest and return on a risky investment, which is eligible for cap-
ital gains, is erroneous. Although the remainderman might not
realize the precise amount of income accruing at the prevailing
discount rate when the income interest was sold, a substantial
amount of income is still almost certain to accrue. This should be
sufficient reason to tax the return as though it were original issue
discount.127 The income accruing to the remainder interest is sim-
TABLE 4b
BEFORE-TAX RETURN TO INCOME AND REMAINDER INTERESTS, ASSUMING $30 BEFORE-
TAX EXPECTED RETURN, 27.1% BEFORE-TAx RISKLESS DISCOUNT RATE, AND SINKING
FUND DEPRECIATION
Total Income Accruing Income Accruing
Expected Before- to $100.64 Investment to $9.09 Investment
Tax Return in Income Interest in Remainder
Year Depreciation Income
1 $ 30 $ 2.73 $ 27.27 $ 2.73
2 30 3.47 26.53 3.47
3 30 4.41 25.60 4.41
4 30 5.60 24.40 5.60
5 30 7.12 22.88 7.12
6 30 9.04 20.96 9.04
7 30 11.50 18.50 11.50
8 30 14.61 15.39 14.61
9 30 18.57 11.43 18.57
10 30 23.60 6.40 23.60
Total $300 $100.64 $199.36 $100.64
126. Another possible argument against taxing the gain accruing to the remainder in-
terest as ordinary income is that the gain is analogous to market discount, which produces
capital gain unless the market discount arises from coupon stripping, see I.R.C. § 1232B(a)
(West Supp. 1983). However, there is no clear holding that market discount is capital gain.
See Weisner v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1150, 1151 (1961); Rev. Rul. 60-210,
1960-1 C.B. 38, 39 (alternative to capital gains on market discount is tax-exempt interest);
(capital gains treatment permitted on very risky investment); see also United States v. Mid-
land-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 58 n.4 (1965) (failing to reach the question). Moreover,
market discount arises from fluctuations in interest rates after an investment is made, but
gain accrues to a retained remainder interest although interest rates may remain constant.
The sole rationale for permitting capital gains treatment on market discount appears to be
special solicitousness for the bond market.
127. See Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 302, 302 (3d Cir. 1964), vacating andremand-
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ilar to defaulted interest accruing after purchasing a debt. Such
interest is taxed as ordinary income-not as a return of capi-
tal-despite the risk associated with recovering the total amount
due.'28 The better way to account for fluctuating value is to per-
mit ordinary instead of capital loss treatment on the amount by
which the original cost of the remainder interest, plus previously
taxed accrued income, exceeds the value of the interest upon
sale. 12 9
Further support for taxing the gain accruing to a discounted
remainder interest as ordinary income can be found outside the
realm of capital gains. Other branches of tax law deal similarly
with this problem. One example is the income taxation of gifts of
a term and remainder interest, wherein the donee of the term in-
terest may not depreciate his basis.' 30 The purpose of this rule is
to ensure that the gain accruing to the remainder interest does not
go untaxed; this is accomplished by taxing the term interest owner
on that gain instead of permitting the respective owners to split
the tax obligation. ' 3' Another example is the assignment-of-in-
come doctrine as applied to a gift of a term interest and a retained
remainder. Instead of allocating all the income to the term inter-
est owner, as in the case of a gift of both term and remainder
ing 40 T.C. 249 (1963). In Jones, the remainder interest was contingent, thus increasing the
risk, but the purchaser's interest was insured. But see Hood v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1140, 1144 (1961).
The issue is not whether the income accruing to the remainder is interest, but whether it
should be treated as ordinary income; the reference to interest is only by way of analogy.
Nonetheless, courts and commentators have erroneously urged that the income must be
interest or else be capital gain. See Note, The Favorable Tax Treatment ofRemainder Inter-
est Investment, 24 TAX L. REv. 527, 537-43 (1969). This mistake was also made in Jones,
and perpetuated by the tax court on remand, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 701, 706 (1966).
128. See First Ky. Co. v. Gray, 309 F.2d 845, 847 (6th Cir. 1962); Motel Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 54 T.C. 1433, 1440 (1970); Tobey v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 610, 618 (1956); cf.
Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-1(0(1) (1980) (value fluctuation attributable to passage of time, such
as that affecting life estates and remainder interests, is excluded in determining value of
estate six months after death).
129. This, in effect, is the result under I.R.C. § 1232B(c) (West Supp. 1983). That sec-
tion taxes as ordinary income the gain realized by the purchaser of a remainder interest in
a bond when the bond is sold, up to the difference between the fair market value of the
bond when the remainder interest was acquired and the purchaser's cost. If market interest
rates rise after the purchase, the gain taxed as ordinary income will be less than the income
which would have accrued annually based on the assumption that the interest rates re-
mained stable.
130. See I.R.C. § 273 (1976).
131. If a tax-exempt charity owns the term interest, the statutory scheme backfires and
the remainderman's income is not taxed.
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interests, the income is fully allocated to the remainder.1 32 This
result may be partially justified on the theory that the donor is
manipulating wealth among family members133 or enjoying the
very act of giving.134 What ultimately justifies this result, how-
ever, is that despite the gift, significant income is accruing to the
donor's retained remainder interest. Indeed, if the accrued in-
come is minimal, as when the income interest is for more than ten
years, the donor is often not taxed on that income.' 35 This result
is best explained on the theory that the reason for taxing the donor
initially is the significant amount of income accruing to his re-
mainder interest.'
36
There are many other situations where term and remainder
interests are split between two taxpayers and either the statute
or case law prevents the remainderman's gain from escaping
ordinary income treatment. The statute requires that gain on re-
mainder interests in bonds accrue periodically as original issue
discount.' 37  Courts frequently reach analogous results: a tax-
132. See Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112, 117 (1940).
133. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 745-48 (1949); Commissioner v. Sun-
nen, 333 U.S. 591, 605, 608-10 (1948); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335 (1940);
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
Taxpayer control in nonfamily situations might also have sufficient tax avoidance po-
tential to require application of the assignment-of-income doctrine. See, e.g., Rubin v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1155, 1162 (1971) (attribution from corporation to corporation's
owner), aI'd, 460 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1972). But see Commissioner v. First Sec. Bank, 405
U.S. 394, 404-05 (1972); Foglesong v. Commissioner, 691 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1982).
134. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. at 117-18; Austin v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 593,
597 (1946), aft'd, 161 F.2d 666 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 767 (1947).
135. See I.R.C. § 673(a) (1976); Rev. Rul. 55-38, 1955-1 C.B. 389, 390. The ten-year
exception is not applicable in all situations. See Rev. Rul. 58-337, 1958-2 C.B. 13, 13-14.
136. When the income interest is for ten years and the tax rate is 50%, the present value
of the tax on the income accruing to the remainderman as a percentage of the present value
of taxes due on the entire income is either 36.49% or 41.92%, depending upon whether the
sinking fund/compound interest or the straight line depreciation method is used. For an
11-year income interest, the figures are 33.24% and 39.34%, respectively; for a 30-year inter-
est, the figures are 5.62% and 16.6%, respectively. This assumes that the income flow ac-
crues perpetually in equal annual amounts. If the income flow is not perpetual or declines
over time, the percentage attributable to the remainder declines.
137. I.R.C. § 1232B(a) (West Supp. 1983) (for purchases after July 1, 1982). I.R.C.
§ 1232B(c) (West Supp. 1983), which covers purchases between August 16, 1954 and July 1,
1982, taxes as ordinary income the gain on disposition of the remainder interest equal to
the difference between the value of the bond when the remainder interest was purchased
and the purchase price. For example, if the owner of a $1000 bond paying 20% interest
detaches 10 years' coupons after the bond has appreciated in value to $1200, the price of
the remainder interest would be $193.81. The gain upon sale by the remainder interest's
owner (up to the difference between $1200 and $193.81) is taxed as ordinary income.
Under the new rule in I.R.C. § 1232B(a) (West Supp. 1983), only the difference between
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payer who retains a term interest in a nondepreciable asset and
transfers the remainder cannot depreciate the retained term inter-
est; 138 a purchaser of a remainder interest must report as ordinary
income that part of the gain which is analogous to original issue
discount; 139 and certain sales of term interests are recast as
loans.40 Devising solutions for every situation in which property
is split into term and remainder interests is beyond the scope of
this Article,"'4 but the pervasiveness of the issue suggests that tax-
the redemption price and the purchase price ($1000 minus $193.81) accrues as ordinary
income.
138. See Lomas Sante Fe, Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 662, 682-84 (1980), afd, 693
F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1773 (1983); see generally Note, Lomas
Sante Fe, Inc. v. Commissioner: Creating Depreciable Estates in Land, I VA. TAX REV. 393
(1981).
Retention-gift situations are similar to sales of a business in exchange for a percentage
of profits, see Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965), or sales to family members, see
Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. Recasting these cases as retention-gift transactions and
adopting the proposal in the text would result in taxing the "sale proceeds" as ordinary
income, because the "seller" would be treated as the owner of the income interest but
denied a basis for depreciation. The Code's solution to the problem of a bootstrap sale to
charity is to allow sale treatment but tax the charity on a declining percentage of the in-
come used to pay the sale price. I.R.C. § 514 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The income taxable
to the charity is roughly equivalent to what an owner of an income interest using sinking
fund depreciation would report. See generally, 4 J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION § 23.36 (rev. ed. 1980) (describing the sinking fund method of depreciation).
139. Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d at 302. But see Hood v. Commissioner, 20
T.C.M. (CCH) at 1143-44. See generally Eustice, Contract Rights, Capital Gain, andAssign-
ment ofIncome-The Ferrer Case, 20 TAX L. REv. 1, 19 (1964); Moses, Intra-Family Sales
ofRemainder Interests Can Freeze Asset Values and Reduce Estate Taxes, 8 ESTATE PLAN-
NING 22, 25-26 (1981); Note, supra note 127, at 537-43.
The result reached in Jones would be hard to justify if the owner of the income interest
were reporting income unaffected by depreciation. However, the principle of the holding is
important if the income interest owner takes depreciation, which is permissible when that
interest is purchased.
140. See Bryant v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 848, 861-62 (1966), ajfd, 399 F.2d 800 (5th
Cir. 1968). The sale-retention transaction might also be treated as a loan. See, e.g., Mapco,
Inc. v. United States, 556 F.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Hydrometals, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 1260, 1265 (1972), af'd, 485 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 416 U.S. 938 (1974); Martin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1255, 1259 (1971), aff'd, 469
F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1972). The buyer must clearly resemble a creditor, however, before the
courts will recast a sale as a loan. See Estate of Stranahan v. Commissioner, 472 F.2d 867,
870-71 (6th Cir. 1973).
I.R.C. § 636 (1976) now treats retained production payments on the sale of mineral
property as a purchase money mortgage even though the dollar amount to be received is
not fixed, see Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a) (1980), but the courts seem to take a narrower view
of what constitutes a credit transaction.
141. Such an analysis would necessarily address the tax treatment of retained interests
disguised as sales. As previously urged, no part of the sale price should be treated as capi-
tal gain. See supra text accompanying note 82. This conclusion raises the issue of cost
recovery. If the seller is treated as the owner of a retained income interest, determining the
correct way for him to recover cost is as problematical as the issue posed by situations
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ing income accruing to retained remainder interests poses difficult
problems, regardless of the form of the underlying property.
The sale of a carved-out income interest doctrine is an attempt
at a simple solution to this problem. Nonetheless, taxing proceeds
from the sale of a carved-out income interest as ordinary income
creates an unfair acceleration of income because, although the
proceeds equal the income which will accrue in the future, they
are taxed before the income accrues. 142 The fairness problem is
not mooted by invoking cases where cash prepayments for inven-
tory or personal services were taxed as ordinary income. 143 The
receipt of cash advances marks an appropriate time to impose tax
because the cost of producing the income has not yet been in-
curred. The sale of a carved-out interest, however, presents an
entirely different situation; there, the taxpayer has already in-
curred a cost to be recovered upon disposition of a capital asset.
One way to remedy the fairness problem would be to tax the
entire sale proceeds as capital gains without permitting recovery
of basis. This is the usual result when the donee or devisee of a
term interest sells that interest. 144 The problem with this solution
is that the capital gains preference may overcompensate for the
acceleration effect. Assume, for example, that $100 of income will
accrue to a remainder interest owned by a taxpayer in the 50% tax
bracket. Were the $100 to be received periodically over a future
time interval, the total tax would be $50 but the present value of
that tax burden would be less than $50. A 50% ordinary income
tax on $100 at the time of sale would therefore exceed the present
value of the future tax payments. However, since the capital gains
where the remainderman is not likely to report as income the value accruing to his interest.
See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. The only difference is that the remainder-
man disguised as buyer is likely to be in a low tax bracket when he participates in a boot-
strap sale whereby the seller retains an income interest. Otherwise, the remainderman
would not realize enough income from the property to compensate the seller in the early
after-sale years for loss of future income which the remainderman is allowed to keep.
Thus, the remainderman is unlikely to be avoiding tax. Under this theory, the seller might
be allowed to recover cost through depreciation. It is important, however, to require the
seller to use sinking fund depreciation. Straight line depreciation would be too generous,
see supra note 108, especially since the remainderman is probably in a low tax bracket and
will be paying very little tax on his income.
142. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. at 267.
143. See, e.g., American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687, 692 (1961).
144. See I.R.C. § 1001(e) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see, e.g., McAllister v. Commissioner,
157 F.2d 235, 236 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947); Bell's Estate v. Commis-
sioner, 137 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir. 1943); Rev. Rul. 72-243, 1972-1 C.B. 233, 233. However,
if the owners of the term and remainder interests sell their interests in the same transaction,
both may recover basis. See I.R.C. § 1001(e)(3) (1976).
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rate is only 40% of the ordinary rate, 45 a capital gains tax on $100
at the time of sale might or might not exceed the present value of
the future tax, depending upon variables such as the interest rate
used to discount the future tax payments, the time over which the
income will be received in the future, and the pattern of income
distribution.
The fairest method for taxing the remainderman is to allow
him to avoid the consequences of the sale of a carved-out interest
doctrine, on condition that he report the ordinary income accruing
annually to the retained remainder interest. This solution is only
acceptable if administratively workable. 146 Valuing the retained
remainder interest at the time of sale of the carved-out income
interest is very difficult. As noted, the accrued income should
equal the compound interest, at the riskless discount rate, that will
accrue to the remainder interest.147 However, there is a much eas-
ier way to determine the amount of income which should accrue:
total income accruing to the remainderman equals the purchase
price, and annual income equals the purchaser's depreciation de-
duction, computed by the sinking fund method on the assumption
that after-depreciation income will accrue to the purchaser at the
before-tax discount rate applicable at the time of sale. Accruing
that amount to the remainder interest treats the remainderman as
if he had deposited the at-sale value of his remainder interest in a
bank account earning interest compounded annually at the
before-tax riskless discount rate prevailing at the time of sale. If
the price of the income interest and the discount rate are known, a
table can be constructed specifying the percentage of that price
equal to annual sinking fund depreciation and therefore equal to
the annual income accruing to the remainderman. 148
145. I.R.C. § 1202(a) (Supp. V 1981) allows individuals to deduct 60% of their capital
gains.
146. Administrative difficulty, not theoretical obstacles, probably explains the prevail-
ing concern over whether gain on the sale of bonds, life insurance, and annuities should be
taxed as ordinary income when the sale occurs long before the due date. See, e.g., Com-
missioner v. Phillips, 275 F.2d 33, 36 n.3 (4th Cir. 1960); Lyon & Eustice, supra note 94, at
372; see also Jones v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 249, 257 n. I (resale to remainderman of inter-
est in a trust while life tenant is still alive), vacated and remanded, 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir.
1963). This concern is misplaced. Although distinguishing ordinary income from gain ac-
cruing due to market forces may appear difficult, the difficulty is easily overcome by com-
puting the amount of annual income accrued at an appropriate interest rate.
147. See supra text accompanying note 125.
148. Valuation cannot be avoided, however, when the purchaser buys the right to a
risky future income flow with a fixed-dollar ceiling. For example, if a taxpayer pays
$100.62 for the right to collect $240 of income produced by an asset when the riskless
before-tax discount rate is 20% and the value of the underlying asset $120, the fraction
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Table 5 provides these figures for five-, eight-, ten-, twelve-,
and fifteen-year income interests, assuming before-tax discount
rates of 8%, 10%, 15% and 20%, respectively.
equal to the purchase price divided by value of the underlying asset (100.62/120 = 83.85%)
identifies the number of years sold (10); this is accomplished by matching the percentage
produced by this fraction with the same percentage appearing under the 20% discount rate
column of Table 3, supra note 114, and finding the corresponding number of years in the
length of income interest column. Without estimating the value of the underlying asset,
there is no way to determine the number of years purchased, and therefore no way to
utilize Table 5, infra text accompanying note 149.
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TABLE
PERCENT OF PURCHASE PRICE FOR THE IN
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION AND REMAINDERMAN
PERIOD PURCHASED AND BEFORE
INCOME PERIOD PURCHASED
5-Year Income Interest
Before-Tax Riskless
Discount Rate
8% 10% 15% 20%
% % % %
17.03 16.38 14.84 13.44
18.41 18.02 17.06 16.12
19.88 19.81 19.61 19.34
21.48 21.79 22.55 23.22
23.20 23.98 25.93 27.87
100.00 99.98 99.99 99.99
8g
9.4
10.1
10.9
11.8
12.7
13.8
14.9
16.1
8-Year Income Interest
Before-Tax RiskIess
Discount Rate
% 10% 15%
40 8.75 7.28
16 9.62 8.38
96 10.57 9.63
83 11.64 11.08 1(
9 12.80 12.75 1:
1 14.08 14.65 15
2 15.48 16.85 18
2 17.04 19.37 21
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
Total
149. The simplicity of using this table is best demonstrated when it is used in connection with
$8.04, when the discount rate is 20% and the purchase price is $100.62. That figure equals 7.99%
99.99 99.98 99.99 100.00
20%
6.06
1.27
8.73
).48
2.56
.08
.10
.72
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COME INTEREST EQUAL TO PURCHASER'S
'S ANNUAL INCOME, DEPENDING ON INCOME
-TAX RISKLESs DISCOUNT RATE
INCOME PERIOD PURCHASED
8%7
6.9
7.4
8.0
8.7
9.3
10.1
10.9
11.8
12.7
13.8
10-Year Income Interest
Before-Tax Riskless
Discount Rate
10% 15% 21
S% %
1 6.28 4.93 3.
5 6.90 5.66 4.
5 7.60 6.51 5.
0 8.35 7.49 6.
9 9.19 8.61 7.
3 10.11 9.91 9.
5 11.11 11.40 11.
3 12.22 13.10 13.
8 13.46 15.06 16.
0 14.79 17.32 19.
0%
85
63
55
65
99
59
51
80
57
88
99.99 100.01 99.99 100.02
12-Year Income Interest
Before-Tax Riskless
Discount Rate
8% 10% 15% 20%
% % % %
5.27 4.68 3.44 2.52
5.69 5.15 3.96 3.03
6.15 5.66 4.56 3.64
6.63 6.22 5.24 4.37
7.17 6.85 6.03 5.24
7.75 7.53 6.94 6.29
8.36 8.28 7.97 7.55
9.02 9.11 9.17 9.06
9.75 10.02 10.55 10.86
10.53 11.02 12.13 13.03
11.38 12.12 13.95 15.65
12.29 13.34 16.04 18.78
99.99 99.98 99.98 100.02
15-Year Income Interest
Before-Tax Riskless
Discount Rate
8% 10% 15% 20%
% % % %
3.38 3.14 2.10 1.39
3.97 3.46 2.42 1.67
4.29 3.81 2.78 2.00
4.64 4.19 3.19 2.40
5.01 4.60 3.67 2.88
5.42 5.07 4.23 3.45
5.84 5.57 4.86 4.15
6.31 6.14 5.59 4.97
6.82 6.74 6.43 5.97
7.36 7.42 7.39 7.17
7.94 8.16 8.51 8.60
8.59 8.98 9.78 10.32
9.27 9.87 11.24 12.37
10.02 10.86 12.93 14.85
10.82 11.95 14.87 17.83
99.98 99.96 99.99 100.02
Table 4a. In Table 4a, sinking fund depreciation in the fifth year of a ten-year income interest is
of the purchase price. See supra note 108.
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This solution gives rise to four problems. First, the purchase
price might be artificially deflated. An election to defer tax might
therefore be denied on intrafamily sales. Second, an appropriate
riskless discount rate must be determined. To this end, the aver-
age interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds for some period end-
ing prior to the sale of the income interest may be used. Third,
the solution invites tax avoidance if the buyer is not required to
use sinking fund depreciation but may instead elect the straight
line method while the remainderman uses the compound interest
method of reporting income illustrated in Tables 2, 4a, and 4b.
Because the compound interest method allocates smaller amounts
of income to the earlier years, total annual income reported by the
seller and buyer in the immediate after-sale years will be lower
than if both parties were to use straight line accounting for depre-
ciation and accrual. The buyer's use of straight line depreciation
should therefore be conditioned on the seller's use of straight line
instead of compound interest accrual, to report income accruing to
the retained remainder interest. Fourth, the purchase price of the
term interest does not equal the remainderman's expected gain if
the asset underlying the carved-out income interest is not expected
to produce income perpetually or future income is not expected to
accrue in equal annual amounts. In such cases, complicated com-
putations are necessary to predict the remainderman's expected
annual gain due to the mere passage of time. 50 While such com-
plexity should be tolerated when it yields significant results, a re-
150. If the asset from which the income interest has been carved is itself of limited
duration, the purchase price of the income interest and the before-tax discount rate can be
used to determine the expected increase in the value of the remainder interest due to the
mere passage of time. The computations would be as follows:
First, the expected annual income flow must be determined, using the same computa-
tion made in determining level payments on a home mortgage. IfR = before-tax discount
rate, PP = purchase price of the carved-out income interest, YI = years of income sold,
and A! = annual income flow,
PP
AZ = (R - PP) + Y-I
E (I+R) F
F-O
yI-I
where the expression I (I+R) F means the sum of the quantities in the formula
F-0
(I + R)F with F increasing annually from 0 to (1I" - 1).
Second, using the expected annual income flow figure derived from the first formula, a
second computation must be made to determine the present value of the expected flow of
income for the entire period of the limited duration asset from which the income interest
has been carved. If Y = number of years' income flow from the limited duration asset, and
TV = total value of that asset, then
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buttable presumption of equal annual income flows in perpetuity
should be adopted.
Recent amendments to the Code illustrate the relevance of this
Article's approach to sales of carved-out income interests, and
point out the problems that can arise absent careful attention to
the underlying structural issues. The new rules require that the
seller of a carved-out income interest in a bond allocate basis be-
tween the income and remainder interests according to their re-
spective values151 and report the difference between the bond's
redemption price and the basis allocable to the retained remainder
interest as original issue discount accruing periodically. 52 The
rules do not, however, adequately address all of the problems dis-
cussed in this Article. First, the rules are mandatory. Without an
election the government will be insufficiently alerted to the trans-
Y
TV= Y (l+R) F
F-I
The value of the remainder interest (R') when the carved-out income interest is sold is
RV = TV - PP. The expected value of the remainder interest upon expiration of the
carved-out income interest (VR) is r-rz
VR = A 41
ld(l+A)F+
F-I
Finally, the expected gain (G) in value due to the mere passage of time is: G = VR - RV.
If the life of the carved-out income interest is long enough but is still a small enough
percentage of the total cost of the underlying asset, the purchase price may be a close
approximation of the gain expected to accrue to the remainderman. For example, if an
eight-year income interest is 25% of the life of the underlying asset, and the before-tax
riskless discount rate is 8%, the gain expected to accrue to the retained remainder interest is
84.23% of the purchase price. This percentage increases as the life of the limited duration
asset increases, the duration of the carved-out interest decreases, or the before-tax riskless
discount rate increases.
Once the gain has been calculated, the amount that accrues each year can be deter-
mined by the percentages in Table 5 for the appropriate discount rate and income period
during which the gain will accrue, or by straight line accrual, depending upon whether the
buyer uses sinking fund or straight line depreciation.
Complexity is also introduced if the future annual income flows are expected to vary.
In that case, the remainder interest's value might not be expected to increase by the amount
of the purchase price and the predicted annual accrual of value might be difficult to com-
pute, regardless of whether the underlying asset produces income perpetually. The best
way to deal with this problem is to presume equal annual income flows and permit either
the taxpayer or the government to rebut the presumption where it would make a significant
difference in computing the gain expected to accrue to the remainderman. This Article
proposes a similar solution when fluctuation in expected future income affects computation
of the lock-in effect. See supra note 64. If total gain accruing to the remainder interest is
computed on the basis of fluctuating income, the simplest method of accruing income an-
nually is straight line accrual. See supra note 108.
151. I.R.C. § 1232B(b)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
152. Id. § 1232B(a), (b)(4) (West Supp. 1983).
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action and will have trouble enforcing periodic accruals of income
to the remainder interest. Second, the purchaser of the income
interest may depreciate his investment using the straight line
method, 153 but the owner of the remainder interest must accrue
income using the slower compound interest method; 54 the effect is
to shelter some income during the early years after sale. These
deficiencies' 55 suggest an answer to a question left open by the
new rules-whether gain on the sale of a carved-out income inter-
est in a bond is capital or ordinary. The potential for tax avoid-
ance that persists in the new rules requires that courts continue to
apply the sale of a carved-out income interest doctrine to gain ex-
ceeding the basis allocable to the income interest, thereby taxing
the gain as ordinary income.
An important conclusion to be drawn from this analysis arises
from the contrast between applying the risk criterion, as imple-
mented by the sale of a carved-out income interest doctrine,' 5 6
and applying the lock-in criterion.' 57 The overbreadth of the sale
of a carved-out income interest doctrine, coupled with the variety
of techniques for taxing the gain accruing to a remainder interest
as ordinary income, signifies the vitality of the risk criterion as
surely as the underapplication of the lock-in criterion indicates the
weakness of the policy against tax-created obstacles to transfera-
bility. 5 ' The question common to both areas of the law is
whether achieving a better fit between doctrine and underlying
policy would so complicate the process as to be counterproduc-
tive.'59 If sales of carved-out income interests were primarily ef-
153. Id. § 167(a), (b)(1) (1976).
154. See id. § 1232A (West Supp. 1983).
155. The new rules likely miss the mark because they were drafted primarily to deal
with tax deferral by purchasers of remainder interests and the creation of deductible losses
by owners of retained remainder interests. H.R. REP. No. 760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 554-55
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 781, 970-73. Depreciation meth-
ods used by income interest purchasers, and collection of tax on income accruing to owners
of retained remainder interests, seem to have escaped notice.
156. See supra notes 94-112 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 46-64 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 81-84 and
accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
159. The following Regulation would implement this proposal:
Regulation L446-X.
(a) General Rule. Except as provided in section (b), the sale of a carved-out
income interest shall be treated as the sale of property, if the seller elects to accrue
income earned on the retained remainder interest in accordance with section (d).
The basis of the property is specified in section (c). The tables in sections (c) and
(d) depend on the discount rate at the time of sale. This discount rate is the
average monthly interest rate paid on ten-year Treasury bonds. The average
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forts to avoid taxes by shifting income within a wealthy family, 6 0
there might be little reason to tolerate complex taxpayer options
for deferring tax. However, sales of carved-out income interests
are analogous to loans,16' suggesting that they might be a useful
financing technique. If they are, accelerating the tax might be an
excessive burden and the complex solution no more burdensome,
given its advantages, than solutions resorted to in other areas of
the law where considerable complexity is tolerated. 62
monthly interest rate shall be the mean of the six most recent monthly interest
rates published by the Treasury more than three months prior to the date of sale.
(b) Sale to a Family Member. Section (a) shall not apply to a sale to a family
member as defined in § 267(c)(4).
(c) B=&rf.
(i) Usual case. Except as provided in subsection (ii), the basis of the
carved-out income interest shall be the percentage of total cost specified in
Table A for the appropriate before-tax discount rate. [Table A would be an
expanded version of Table 3, supra note 114.]
(ii) Other cases. If the carved-out income interest is not for a fixed pe-
riod of years, or if future income is not expected to accrue in equal annual
amounts, or if the property out of which the income interest is carved is not
expected to produce income perpetually, the basis of the carved-out income
interest shall be a fraction of the total cost, equal to the purchase price of the
income interest divided by the value of the asset out of which the interest was
carved.
(d) Income Accruing to the Retained Remainder Interest.
(i) Usual case. Except as provided in subsection (ii), the election pro-
vided for in section (a) shall result in annual accrual of income to the re-
tained remainder interest, in an amount equal to a percentage of the sale
price of the carved-out income interest, as provided in Table B, for the ap-
propriate period of years and before-tax discount rate, or in an amount equal
to a percentage of the purchase price equal to the reciprocal of the number of
years for which the carved-out interest will exist (that is, straight line ac-
crual). [Table B would be an expanded version of Table 5,supra text accom-
panying note 149.]
Straight line accrual is required unless the purchaser of the carved-out
income interest uses sinking fund depreciation. If the income interest sold
will not run for a fixed period, the number of years sold for purposes of
applying Table B shall be determined by matching the percentage of the ba-
sis of the entire property represented by the basis of the income interest, and
the relevant before-tax discount rate, with the period of years specified in
Table A in (c)(i) above.
(ii) Other cases. If the future income is not expected to accrue in equal
annual amounts, or if the property out of which the income interest is carved
is not expected to produce income perpetually, the sale price of the income
interest shall not be used to compute the annual income accruing to the re-
mainder interest, unless use of the sale price would provide a satisfactory
approximation. [See supra note 150 for a suggestion how the income accru-
ing to the remainder interest would then be determined.]
160. Cf. Note, supra note 127, at 527 (suggesting that sales of remainder interests are
generally made by heirs to large fortunes).
161. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
162. See, eg., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(2)(il) (1981) (price-interest recomputa-
tion rule).
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IV. INVESTMENT
Encouraging transferability and risk are two reasons for the
capital gains preference. The third is encouraging significant per-
sonal investment. The investment criterion has intuitive appeal
and a basis in history. Examples of capital assets in early legisla-
tive history presupposed taxpayer investment, and subsequent
rules permitting capital gains treatment of the sale of business
property suggest that investment is a necessary condition for the
preference.163 Stock, the modem paradigm of a capital asset, also
requires investment. Yet the case for the investment criterion rests
on more than history and intuitive appeal: it has been used by the
courts to develop doctrine defining capital assets.
The most important cases in which the presence or absence of
163. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text. Not all investments necessarily
deserve preferential treatment. Business assets, for example, have a confused history.
Before 1942, gain on corporate-owned business assets was denied preferential treatment.
Capital gains treatment was not imperative for corporations, however, because ordinary
rates on corporate income and capital gains rates on individual income were almost identi-
cal until 1933. Sutherland, A Brief Descriotion of Federal Taxes on Corporations Since
1881, 7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 266, 280 (1940). See also Statement of Dr. T.S. Adams,
supra note 23, at 37. After 1933, during the Depression, the treatment of losses, not gains,
was the focus of attention. See TREASURY STUDY, supra note 12, at 36-38, 40. Nonethe-
less, when business assets, particularly corporate gains, were scrutinized during World War
II, only real and depreciable business property were targeted for preferential capital gains
treatment. See A.L.I., supra note 4, at 353-54. See generally Chirelstein, supra note 24, at
36-43 (discussing capital gains treatment of business-related securities and terminated con-
tracts); A.L.I., supra note 4, at 2-4, 59-65, 347-63 (capital gains treatment of business prop-
erty).
Uncertainty about the proper treatment of business assets is illustrated by cases dealing
with whether investment assets such as stocks and bonds are ordinary assets when acquired
to ensure a source of supply or a market for the taxpayer's goods. In W.W. Windle Co. v.
Commissioner, 65 T.C. 694, 708-10 (1976), appeal dismissed, 550 F.2d 43 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977), the tax court reviewed 17 prior cases, all but 4 of which held
that these intangible investments were not capital assets. The tax treatment of such assets
may have been determined more by the fact that the cases usually involve deductibility of
losses, than by any theory regarding the status of business assets as ordinary or capital.
Only one of the cases cited in Windle (Agway Inc. v. United States, 524 F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl.
1975)) involved gain. That the cases usually involve losses is relevant--there is little reason
to limit capital loss deductions absent a serious risk of taxpayer manipulation such as at-
tempts to realize gain in low tax bracket years and loss in high bracket years. See TREAS-
URY STUDY, supra note 12, at 61-63; L. SELTZER, supra note 20, at 187-88. If a court finds
minimal opportunity for manipulation where a taxpayer incurs a loss on an investment
intended to ensure a source of supply or a market, and losses rather than gains are expected
to predominate, allowing ordinary loss treatment through the only technique available to
the court--the denial of capital asset status-is reasonable. On the other hand, if the court
were to assume that most such losses are the result of taxpayers concealing ordinary gain, it
might find capital asset status, thereby invoking the capital loss limitations. See W.W.
Windle Co., 65 T.C. at 712-13, Rev. Rul. 78-94, 1978-1 C.B. 58, 58; Note, A Spreading of
Receipts Formula, supra note 24, at 734-35.
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an investment has been significant in defining capital assets in-
volve the sale of a contract right."6 These cases involve the tax-
payer's right to earn money by performing personal services as an
employee 165 or independent contractor, 66 or by selling 167 or buy-
ing168 business property. The absence of an investment usually
justifies denying the capital gains preference, 69 but in rare con-
164. See generalo, Chirelstein, supra note 24 (analyzing tax consequences of premature
termination of business contracts); Eustice, supra note 139 (discussing Commissioner v.
Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962)); A.L.I., supra note 4, at 195-225, 292-95 (reviewing
capital gains treatment of contract rights transfers).
165. See Foxe v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 21, 25-28 (1969); Jessop v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 491, 498 (1951); Gann v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 388, 396 (1940); McFall v. Com-
missioner, 34 B.T.A. 108, 110 (1936).
166. See Furrer v. Commissioner, 566 F.2d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 1977) (agency contract
with insurance company produced ordinary income), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978);
Flower v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 140, 149 (1973) (promotion and sales representation con-
tract produced ordinary income), af'd mem., 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir. 1974); Vaaler v.
United States, 454 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1972) (agency contract with insurance com-
pany produced ordinary income); Elliott v. United States, 431 F.2d 1149, 1154-57 (10th
Cir. 1970) (same); Bankers Guar. Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 418 F.2d 1084,
1085-86 (6th Cir. 1969) (mortgage service contract produced ordinary income); General
Guar. Mortgage Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 F.2d 518, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1964) (same); United
States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 291-92 (5th Cir. 1963) (agency contract with insurance
company produced ordinary income); Hyatt v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir.
1963) (same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964); Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320
F.2d 929, 932-35 (5th Cir. 1963) (mortgage servicing contract produced ordinary income);
United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d I11, 115-17 (5th Cir. 1962) (agency contract with insur-
ance company produced ordinary income), modified, 312 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1963); Holt v.
Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1962) (motion picture producer's share of profits
for producing films taxed as ordinary income); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205
F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir.) (exclusive booking agency produced ordinary income), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 866 (1953); Kathman v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 125, 129 (1968) (right to future
sales commissions taxed as ordinary income); King Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 542, 552 (1967) (contract to transmit recorded music produced ordinary income); Paul
Small Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 223, 227-28 (1961) (theatrical agency contract
produced ordinary income). But cf. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d
897, 901 (5th Cir. 1972) (mortgage servicing contract produced capital gain); Jones v. Cor-
byn, 186 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1950) (insurance agency contract produced capital gain).
Moreover, good will created by personal services is "property" eligible for capital gains.
See infra note 195 and accompanying text.
167. See Commissioner v. Starr Bros., 204 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1953) (payment re-
ceived by wholesaler for releasing rights to exclusive distributorship taxed as ordinary in-
come); Spray Water Power & Land Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (P-H) 376, 381 (1961)
(payment to seller of water in exchange for release from obligation to buy taxed as ordinary
income).
168. See Commercial Solvents Corp. v. United States, 427 F.2d 749, 758 (Ct. Cl.) (right
to purchase deemed ordinary income), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970); Commissioner v.
Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 351-52 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919 (1958); Leh v.
Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489, 493-94 (9th Cir. 1958) (same); Vf. Norton v. United States,
551 F.2d 821, 826-27 (Ct. CI.) (right to cut standing timber not a capital asset), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 831 (1977).
169. Norton v. United States, 551 F.2d at 826-27; see Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d
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tract right cases where investment has been proven, the capital
gains preference was allowed. 7 ' The investment criterion also ex-
plains the Supreme Court's decision that a landlord was ineligible
for the capital gains preference on payment made by a tenant in
exchange for release from a rental agreement after market rentals
had plunged during the Depression.' 7 ' Although the Court
stressed that the payment was a substitute for future income, the
decision is best explained by the fact that the landlord had no
investment in the premium lease itself.'72 The absence of invest-
ment also explains the denial of the capital gains preference to the
taxpayer selling blood 7 3 or a right of privacy.'74
Practical application of the investment criterion may be diffi-
cult. ' While the contract itself may not involve an investment,
the taxpayer may have made other investments to enable him to
engage in the business that has generated the contract. For exam-
ple, if investment in a distributorship entitles the taxpayer to capi-
tal gains, why should the investment in an underlying business not
687, 691 (9th Cir. 1962); Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d at 348; Spray Water Power
& Land Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (P-H) at 380-81; A.L.I., supra note 4, at 53, 190,
214.
170. See Martin v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 341, 362 (1968); I.R.C. § 1241 (1976); see
also Commissioner v. Goff, 212 F.2d 875, 876 (3d Cir.) (taxpayer invested in machines and
contracted for percentage of profits from their use; sale of profit right produced capital
gains), aff'd, 348 U.S. 829 (1954).
The conversion of future personal service income into capital gains through the use of
corporate stock is inconsistent with contract right cases denying capital gains. See Surrey,
Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 985, 1003 (1956). When
stock received for personal services is included in taxable income, however, the taxpayer
has in effect received taxable cash and invested it in stock. The stock is then properly
considered a capital asset. Cf. I.R.C. § 83(b) (1976) (election to include stock as ordinary
income prior to statutory time limit results in capital gain on future stock appreciation).
171. See Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1941).
172. Cf. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., 364 U.S. 130, 135 (1960) ("the right
to use is not a capital asset, but is simply an incident of the underlying physical
property").
173. See United States v. Garber, 589 F.2d 843, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1979). The dissent
would have allowed the capital gains preference if the taxpayer could have proven an in-
vestment. See id. at 850 (Clark, J., dissenting). On rehearing en banc, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th
Cir. 1979), Judge Clark wrote for the majority that basis may necessarily have equalled
value. The dissent correctly pointed out that this statement was transparently erroneous.
See id. at 103-04; see also A.L.I., supra note 4, at 126-27 (recommending that income from
disposition of patents and copyrights be treated as ordinary income); Note, A Spreading of
Receipts Formula, supra note 24, at 744.
174. See Roosevelt v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 77, 87-89 (1964) (right of privacy not
capital asset); Miller v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 631, 645 (1961) (same), aff'd, 299 F.2d 706
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 923 (1962).
175. See Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 35; cf. I.R.C. § 704(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
l(e)(1)(iv) (1980) (substantial partnership investment permits partners' income deflection).
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be attributable to an exclusive purchase contract?1 7 6  Further-
more, why should the taxpayer's investment in education not be
attributable to personal service contracts? The explanation may
lie in the investment criterion's purpose of encouraging out-of-
pocket investment. 177 When there has been no investment in the
contract itself, preferential treatment upon disposition of a
favorable contract incidental to the underlying investment should
depend on a demonstration that the prospect of such preferential
treatment influenced the original investment. Since such a gener-
alization would be difficult to sustain, preferential capital gains
treatment might only be allowed when the taxpayer sells the un-
derlying investment along with the contract, 178 because denying
capital gains on such a liquidating disposition might deter the ini-
tial investment. 179
Whether the investment criterion successfully explains the re-
sults in contract right cases depends on determining that no other
explanation works as well. Consider as alternative explanations
176. See A.L.I., supra note 4, at 59-60 (this should be done "on the view that the partic-
ular asset need not qualify as an 'investment-type' asset since the business as a whole repre-
sents an investment"); cf. Michaels v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 17, 19 (1949) (covenants not
to compete are capital assets if incidental to transfer of good will).
177. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
178. But cf. King Broadcasting Co. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 542, 547-50 (1967) (sale
of personal service contract produced ordinary income because it was not ancillary to si-
multaneous sale of franchise which was a capital asset).
179. The doctrinal basis for ordinary income treatment of nonliquidating sales of busi-
ness assets would be an expansive reading of Corn Products Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350
U.S. 46 (1955). See Norton v. United States, 551 F.2d 821, 826-27 (Ct. Cl. 1977); Chirel-
stein, supra note 24, at 37; cf. A.L.I., supra note 4, at 354.
Other hints of a distinction between liquidating and nonliquidating dispositions of busi-
ness assets support the view that nonliquidating sales produce ordinary gain. First, only
liquidating bulk sales of inventory are eligible for favorable treatment under I.R.C.
§ 337(b)(2) (1976). Second, nonliquidating dividends of inventory may be taxed to the
distributing corporation. United States v. Lynch, 192 F.2d 718, 721-22 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952). Third, the liquidation-nonliquidation distinction appeared in
some early cases involving net operating loss carryovers; these cases included nonliquidat-
ing, but not liquidating, losses on business assets in the definition of preferentially treated
net operating losses. See, e.g., Independent Brick Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 862,
868-69 (1928); Phillip Kobbe Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 663, 664 (1926). However, the
government objected to treating either type as net operating losses, I.T. 1943, 3-1 C.B. 65,
66-67 (1924), and courts interpreting a later statute agreed. See, e.g., Ford v. Commis-
sioner, 31 T.C. 119, 123 (1958).
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the transferability and risk criteria. The courts' refusal to treat
contract rights as capital assets might be based as much on the
transferability criterion as on the lack of investment. In most of
these cases, the future income period under the contract is so short
that no lock-in effect occurs; 180 on the other hand, in a case in-
volving a contract right to perform personal services which ex-
tended for the life of a surviving partner in the personal service
business, the court found capital gains on disposition of the
right. 181 Likewise, the sale or exchange requirement, which is fre-
quently invoked to deny capital gains when a contract right is re-
leased to another party to the contract, 1 2 might be explained by
the transferability criterion. This explanation flows from the
premise that the release indicates the right is not easily transfera-
ble, so that the capital gains preference, intended to overcome ob-
stacles to transferability, becomes unnecessary. 83  The difficulty
with the transferability explanation for sale of contract rights
180. See, e.g., Vaaler v. United States, 454 F.2d 1120, 1121 (8th Cir. 1972) (contract
terminable at will upon 60 days' notice); Elliott v. United States, 431 F.2d 1149, 1150 (10th
Cir. 1970) (contract terminable at will on 30 days' notice); Bankers Guar. Title & Trust Co.
v. United States, 418 F.2d 1084, 1085 (6th Cir. 1969) (at will); United States v. Eidson, 310
F.2d 111, 112 (5th Cir. 1962) (6 years); Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489, 490-92 n.3
(9th Cir. 1958) ( year); Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344, 345-46 (2d Cir. 1958)
(4 / years); Commercial Solvents Corp. v. United States, 427 F.2d 749, 751 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (8
years); Foxe v. Commissioner, 53 T.C. 21, 22-24 (1969) (2 years); Paul Small Artists, Ltd.
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 223, 224-26 (1961) (2 years); Jessop v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.
491, 493 (1951) (3V years); Gann v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. 388, 392-93 (1940) (74
years); McFall v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 108, 109 (1936) (2 years); see also Chirelstein,
supra note 24, at 33.
181. See Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1950). This case is generally
considered an aberration. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1962).
182. See Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d at 494 (purchase contract); General Artists
Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360, 361 (2d Cir. 1953) (exclusive agent); Commissioner
v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1953) (same); Paul Small Artists, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 228 (same); see also A.L.I., supra note 4, at 196, 199, 201, 207;
Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 11; Eustice, supra note 139, at 3-4.
183. Merely because a contract right is released does not mean that it is not transfera-
ble. Criticism of mechanical applications of the sale or exchange criterion is therefore
justified, see Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d at 131; A.L.I., supra note 4, at 292-95;
Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 32-33; Eustice, supra note 139, at 6-7 n.17, 19-20 n.49, be-
cause the choice between sale and release of transferable assets should not be distorted by
tax law, cf. I.R.C. § 165(g)(1) (1976) (providing for capital loss treatment when capital asset
securities become worthless). Many personal service contracts and rights to distributor-
ships may not be assignable, at least not without the consent of the other party, and some of
the cases involve such contracts. See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111, 112-13
(5th Cir. 1962) (consent needed for assignment of agency contract; ordinary income); see
also Elliott v. United States, 431 F.2d at 1150 (same); Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson.
320 F.2d 929, 931 (5th Cir. 1963) (mortgage servicing contract nonassignable but assign-
ment customarily allowed; ordinary income); cf. Gann v. Commissioner, 41 B.T.A. at
396-97 (contract for personal services cannot be sold). But see Nelson Weaver Realty Co.
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cases is that the capital gains preference is usually disallowed
when the income period is long and the lock-in effect therefore
serious. 184 Moreover, the sparse case law on the relevance of con-
tract length to capital gains treatment has been contradictory.18 5
Alternatively, the risk criterion might better explain sale of
contract right cases than the investment criterion. The gain upon
disposition of a contract right is usually the gain accruing to the
taxpayer's risk upon entering the contract. 186 However, sale pro-
ceeds may not always be a reward for economic risk. Where sell-
ers can enter many contracts based on the same underlying prop-
erty or services, the price for foregoing an advantageous contract
right will be based not only on the difference between the high
contract price and the lower market value of the contract's subject
matter, but also on the market value of the subject matter itself' t87
In the context of a family corporation, payments made upon re-
tirement of a controlling employee would not be limited to gain
on the employment contract but might include some of the salary
which he could earn by working elsewhere. Moreover, parties to a
contract might have made commitments which they cannot avoid
when they give up their contract or property rights.'t8  For exam-
ple, a seller might be locked into a contract to purchase raw
materials even though he has sold his long term contract to supply
goods made from the raw materials. Since such unavoidable ex-
penses may later be deducted as ordinary deductions, the proceeds
of the sale of contract rights do not equal the taxpayer's gain on
investment, but should instead be taxed as ordinary income to the
extent necessary to offset ordinary deductions.18 9
v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1962) (consent needed for assignment of
mortgage servicing contract; capital gain).
184. See United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1963) (capital gains
preference disallowed upon disposition of contract rights on 19-year contract); Flower v.
Commissioner, 61 T.C. 140, 145-49 (1973) (same), aj'd mem., 505 F.2d 1302 (5th Cir.
1974); Spray Water Power & Land Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 353, 355 (1961)
(no preference when contract period was over 900 years). But see Jones v. Corbyn, 186
F.2d at 452.
185. Compare Maryland Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 225 F. Supp. 854, 858
(E.D. Pa. 1964) (length of contract irrelevant), with Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d
at 348 (short period relevant).
186. See A.L.I., supra note 4, at 209-10 n.19; Chirelstein, supra note 24, at 26-32.
187. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRAcTS 541-42 (2d ed. 1977).
188. This may well have been the case in Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 31
T.C. 971, 973-74 (1959), rep'd, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960), where a portion of the sale
proceeds seems to have been compensation for unavoidable expenses.
189. The proceeds are analogous to prepaid income, to be offset by future deductible
expenses. The taxpayer can only hope to defer tax on the prepayment. Cf. Treas. Reg.
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The situations where sale proceeds are not rewards for eco-
nomic risk are too uncommon, however, to explain the denial of
the capital gains preference in most contract right cases. Cer-
tainly, courts have never based their decisions on such narrow
grounds. 90 Thus, the investment criterion theory-not transfera-
bility or risk-must be seriously considered as the best explana-
tion for the ordinary income treatment of contract right sales.
The most serious problem with accepting the investment crite-
rion is that while it is a factor in contract right sales, it virtually
vanishes where property rights are sold. The sale of traditional
property rights such as landlords" 9' or tenants' 92 rights under a
lease, the right to use a patent, 93 or the option to acquire property
which is itself a capital asset, 194 results in capital gains, apparently
without regard to the investment criterion. Even the good will of
a personal service business is a capital asset.' 95 To be sure, the
investment criterion is occasionally relevant in property right
§ 1.451-5(b), (c) (1976) (prepayment for goods and long term contracts); Rev. Proc. 71-21,
1971-2 C.B. 549, 549 (prepayment for services).
190. A few of the cases denying capital gains treatment may be explained by the fact
that they involved unspecified mixtures of accrued ordinary income and future income
rights. See, e.g., United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d at 116; Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d
687, 689 (9th Cir. 1962); General Artists Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d at 361; Paul
Small Artists, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. at 227; see also Chirelstein, supra note 24, at
26. The taxpayer's failure to separate out any capital asset element should justify taxing
the entire gain as ordinary income. None of these cases, however, suggest a willingness to
permit the taxpayer to allocate.
191. See Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d at 594 (lessor's release of
entire interest to lessee qualifies for capital gains preference); Miller v. Commissioner, 48
T.C. 649, 655 (1967) (same).
192. See Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummon, Inc., 210 F.2d 752, 753 (2d Cir.)
(lessee surrendered lease to lessor; capital gain), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commis-
sioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390, 391-92 (5th Cir.) (lessee released lessor from obligation under
restrictive covenant; capital gain), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Commissioner v. Go-
lonsky, 200 F.2d 72, 73-74 (3d Cir. 1952) (lessee surrendered lease to lessor; capital gain),
cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953); see also Kingsbury v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 1068,
1083-87 (1976) (personal service arrangement interpreted as lease; capital gain); I.R.C.
§ 1241 (cancellation of lease treated as sale).
193. See United States v. Dresser Indus., 324 F.2d 56, 59-61 (5th Cir. 1963) (payment
to licensee who surrendered license to licensor treated as capital gain).
194. See Dorman v. United States, 296 F.2d 27, 30-31 (9th Cir. 1961) (surrender of
option to acquire partnership interest produced capital gain); Fraser v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 41, 51 (1975) (same). But see Saunders v. United States, 450 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.
1971) (sale of real estate option where coinvestors had buy-out rights produced ordinary
income).
195. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Commis-
sioner, 53 T.C. 414, 426 (1969); Kenney v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1161, 1173 (1962); Ait-
ken v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 227, 230 (1960); see also Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v.
Commissioner, 307 F.2d at 901 (capital gains preference allowed on sale of mortgage serv-
ice contract) (explained in United States v. Eidson, 310 F.2d 111, 116 (5th Cir. 1962), as
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cases. Where the asset is the right to block another's use of prop-
erty, the absence of investment may foreclose capital gains treat-
ment.196 Similarly, the absence of investment in a premium lease
led at least one court to decide that sale of the lease to a tenant
produced ordinary income. 197 Generally, however, investment is
not a prerequisite for capital gains treatment of property rights.1 98
One explanation for the pervasive capital gains treatment of
property rights is that traditional property law concepts have been
blindly imported into the tax law.199 Even if that is true, however,
the role of property law in defining capital assets has been very
limited-property law doctrine has frequently given way to tax
doctrine."co It may well be that no principled, rational reason ex-
ists for abandoning the investment criterion when property rights
are sold. For those schooled in the common law tradition, how-
ever, this concession is difficult to make. Even doctrinal confu-
sion-which often arises when an old principle has weakened
prior to agreement on a new principle-may signify that a rational
process is at work. Here, the old principle is that the capital gains
preference requires both investment and risk; the new principle is
that risk alone determines eligibility for the preference. Until the
new principle supplants the old, however, courts might exploit
weaknesses in the existing doctrine rather than discard it
completely.
involving good will); Rev. Rul. 70-45, 1970-1 C.B. 17 (whether good will has been trans-
ferred is question of fact).
When accrued value attributable to personal services is not embodied in good will, it is
not a capital asset. See Hodges v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 428, 439 (1968); Luna v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C. 1067, 1079 (1964); Brown v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 861, 868 (1963);
Turner v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 304, 309 (1962). See generally Miller, Capital Gains Tax-
ation of the Fruits of Personal Effort: Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 YALE L.J. 1,
25-33 (1954).
196. See Bellamy v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 487, 498 (1965).
197. Hort v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 922, 926 (1939), a f'd, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). The
government's Supreme Court brief in this case argued that the lease was merely contractual
and not a property right. Brief for Respondent at 10, Hort.
198. Moreover, property rights are deemed capital assets notwithstanding the absence
of a serious lock-in effect. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. One of the earli-
est cases involving the sale of a property right, Sutliff v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 446,
447-48 (1942), may have involved a serious lock-in effect because the lease which was sold
extended for the lessee's life. Cf. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450, 452 (10th Cir. 1950)
(contract right extending for life of surviving partner is capital asset). However, courts
subsequently have ignored the transferability criterion. See supra note 49 and accompany-
ing text.
199. The domination of property law over tax law seems especially strong in the area of
life estates. See Estate of Camden v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942) (carved-out
income interest in life estate is capital asset), a'dper curiam, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
200. See, eg., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
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One technique is to incorporate property law concepts into tax
law so that property rights are deemed capital assets regardless of
the presence of investment. Another is to effect a compromise by
allocating between capital gain and ordinary income, as courts
have done where good will is sold with a contract right.20  A simi-
lar compromise was effected by the Ferrer202 court, which allo-
cated proceeds from the sale of a play. The court afforded capital
gains treatment to the sale of production rights and veto rights
preventing the play's exploitation through other media, but
treated as ordinary income that portion of the proceeds derived
from the sale of future motion picture profit rights. The en-
trepreneurial nature of the taxpayer's dealings20 3 undoubtedly
helped induce the Ferrer court's compromise. One conclusion to
be drawn from the confusing array of approaches presented here
is that the investment criterion, like the lock-in criterion, may be
losing its significance in defining capital gains.
V. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK AHEAD
The deep structure of the capital gains preference encourages
transferability, risk, and investment. This much is apparent from
the history and development of capital gains doctrine.2 ' Al-
though the doctrine should mediate creatively between statutory
language and structure, it has not done so. 20 5 Serious lock-in ef-
201. See Bankers Guar. Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 418 F.2d 1084, 1086 (6th
Cir. 1969); General Guar. Mortgage Co. v. Tomlinson, 335 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1964);
United States v. Woolsey, 326 F.2d 287, 292 (5th Cir. 1963); Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tom-
linson, 320 F.2d 929, 934-35 (5th Cir. 1963); Realty Loan Corp. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
1083, 1093 (1970), affd on other grounds, 478 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1973). But see Furrer v.
Commissioner, 566 F.2d 1115, 1117-18 (no good will in personal service contract), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 903 (1978); Vaaler v. United States, 454 F.2d 1120, 1123 (8th Cir. 1972)
(same); Elliott v. United States, 431 F.2d 1149, 1154 (10th Cir. 1970) (same); Foxe v. Com-
missioner, 53 T.C. at 26 (ordinary income).
Perhaps the high water mark of permitting capital gains on the sale of a personal serv-
ice contract was reached in Bankers Guar. Title & Trust Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp.
522, 527 (N.D. Ohio), aft'd, 418 F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1969). The district court held that a
contract terminable at will had value and was a capital asset because it had been frequently
renewed. Renewal is evidence of good will but the contract itself cannot have value.
202. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
203. Id. at 132. Cf. Rev. Rul. 55-706, 1955-2 C.B. 300, 301-02 (capital gains preference
given to motion picture entrepreneur who sold fully depreciated films); Denison v. Com-
missioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1759, 1762-63 (1977) (capital gains preference allowed on sale
of option anticipating capital investment if exercised). Entrepreneurial activity may also
help to avoid the personal holding company tax. See Rev. Rul. 75-249, 1975-1 C.B. 171,
172.
204. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
205. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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fect has not been a prerequisite to capital gains treatment,20 6 and
the retained income interest rules do little to require risk shift-
ing.20 7 Giving ordinary income treatment to proceeds of a sale of
a carved-out income interest correctly taxes some of the relatively
riskless income accruing to the remainderman, but overtaxes the
remainderman by accelerating the tax payment.208 Finally, judi-
cial doctrine regarding the sale of a contract right is hopelessly
confused. The courts appear to require an investment, but that
requirement may be waived when the taxpayer sells an entire
property interest, including property whose value derives from
personal services.20 9
Are these criticisms of the capital gains rules too harsh? After
all, overbreadth and underbreadth are often the necessary price of
workable rules. Is current doctrine the best alternative because a
more precise meshing of doctrine and policy is too difficult? The
case favoring the current rules would emphasize a wide variety of
factors. For one, why should so much solicitousness be shown
taxpayers selling carved-out income interests? These sales are too
unlikely to serve useful economic goals to warrant the efforts in-
volved in treating the transaction as a sale-allocating basis to the
income interest, computing income accruing to the remainder-
man, and measuring the seriousness of obstacles to transferability.
Furthermore, taxing the sale of a contract right as ordinary in-
come is acceptable for two reasons: investment is usually lack-
ing,210 and the lock-in effect is minimal.21' The underbreadth of
the rules dealing with risk transfer, and the complete indifference
to calculating the lock-in effect can also be justified by a combina-
tion of administrative and economic considerations; here the ad-
vantage lies with the taxpayer on the theory that the extra
administrative effort might discourage economically useful
transactions. 21
2
However, claims that administrative difficulty justifies a poor
fit between legal rules and underlying policy should be suspect.
Immense complexity is tolerated when it seems worthwhile.2"3
Moreover, it is too easy to assume that application of an adminis-
206. See supra notes 44-64, 83-84, and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 70-82 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying note 143.
209. See supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 164-74.
211. See supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 77-82, 159-62, and accompanying text.
213. See, eg., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(2)(ii) (1981).
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trative solution is as complicated as the analytical route by which
the solution is reached. This Article has sought to show that, with
a few simple but acceptable assumptions, the remainderman's in-
come and the period of income flow creating excessive lock-in ef-
fects can indeed be computed.2 14 Therefore, factors other than
avoiding complexity must explain the mismatch between doctrine
and structure.
First, the necessary computations are unfamiliar to lawyers
and judges. They depend to a large extent on discounting future
income to account for the time value of money-a consideration
that has been difficult to incorporate into tax policy analysis. De-
spite growing attention to such computations in the basic law
school tax course,215 many students remain uncomfortable with
such reasoning. 1 6 Of at least equal importance is the fact that
basing rules on such computations may so mystify the affected
public as to deprive the rules of acceptability, despite the efforts of
those who strive to overcome these difficulties.21 7
Second, there are institutional obstacles to adopting the rules
proposed in this Article. The rules are based on bright-line dis-
tinctions that must vary over time, and thus would be difficult for
courts to embrace on their own. The measurement of income ac-
cruing to a remainderman and lock-in effect varies with discount
rates; both must be periodically identified by an administering
agency. Courts disposed to undertaking the lock-in analysis
presented in this Article, for example, could do little more than
identify extreme cases of the presence or absence of lock-in ef-
fect, 218 decide how to treat these extreme cases, and place the rest
on the other side of the line. The computation of income accruing
to the remainder interest would also be an unfamiliar judicial
task, being essentially an accounting problem usually left to the
214. See supra notes 64, 159.
215. For example, M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 333-38 (3d ed. 1982)
(reprinting A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS 205-09 (2d ed. 1967)), a
popular introductory tax reference, uses similar computations. Other examples of sources
using comparable analyses include S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 108-13,
120-25 (1973); Blum, An Introduction to the Mathematics of Tax Planning, 57 TAXES 707
(1979); Jacobs, Of No Interest: Truth, Substance and Bargain Borrowing, 9 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 261, 265-68, 273-77, 294-310 (1981).
216. Cf. Note, supra note 24, at 755 (commenting on lawyers' unfamiliarity with
mathematics).
217. Several Regulations make use of such computations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-12(e)(2) (1975); § 1.483-1(c)(3) (1980); § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(ii)(d) (1981).
218. Such would be the case when very long or very short periods of income are sold.
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Internal Revenue Service.2 9
Third, judges seem reluctant to incorporate an economic justi-
fication for capital gains into their analysis, and instead argue that
the preference is justified on fairness considerations stemming
from income bunching.2 ° Perhaps courts are compelled for insti-
tutional reasons to rationalize results on fairness instead of eco-
nomic grounds. Whatever the judicial tendencies might be,
however, the development of tax expenditure analysis has estab-
lished economic policy as part of the tax law's fabric from which
courts can reason in interpreting the law.2
Finally, the growth of capital gains doctrine may be evaluated
from a different perspective-instead of basing the mismatch be-
tween doctrine and structure on institutional considerations affect-
ing courts, administrators, and the tax bar, one might accept the
unfolding of substantive rules at face value and try to understand
them as the result of a creative dialogue between the legislature
and the courts. The initial legislative emphasis on transferability
and out-of-pocket investment has been weakened on its way
through the adjudicative process so that these criteria are now
only sporadically applied, but the vitality of the risk factor contin-
ues unabated.222 The absence of risk is the core of the sale of a
carved-out income interest doctrine,22 3 which is otherwise inex-
plicable; the presence of risk explains the curious extension of cap-
ital gains treatment to property interest transactions lacking out-
of-pocket investment, as well as the willingness of some courts to
find part capital gain, part ordinary income when a personal serv-
ice business disposes of a valuable right to future income.224
What the courts may really be saying is that risk may be taken in
many forms, so that selectively excluding some of them from the
capital gains preference would be unfair, and that courts have a
role in the dialogue from which the deep structure of the capital
gains preference evolves.
219. See, e.g., Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128, 135 (1963) (refusing to defer tax
on prepaid income). The Internal Revenue Service, better able to determine the appropri-
ate deferral period, has adopted several deferral provisions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5
(1976); Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, 549.
220. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
221. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX EXPENDITURES: CURRENT
ISSUES AND FIVE-YEAR BUDGET PROJECTIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1982-1986 (1981) (ana-
lyzing the economic policy underlying tax expenditures).
222. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
224. See supra text accompanying note 201.
